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98 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (2020) 
PAYING FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION* 
RUSSELL M. GOLD** 
American criminal law vastly overuses pretrial detention even as it purports to 
presume defendants innocent. This Article compares financial incentives in 
pretrial detention to those in civil preliminary injunctions. Both are procedures 
where one of the parties seeks relief before judgment. And yet, these two 
procedures employ financial incentives in opposite ways. Civil procedure 
discourages interim relief by requiring plaintiffs to bear financial risk when they 
obtain a preliminary injunction. Criminal law does the opposite—encouraging 
interim relief by requiring defendants to pay to avoid pretrial detention. The 
reasons that civil procedure relies on financial incentives to discourage requests 
for interim relief—to avoid undue settlement pressure and compensate for losses 
inflicted on defendants because of hasty procedure—apply with at least as much 
force in criminal law. Thus, this Article contends that employing diametrically 
opposed approaches to interim relief in the two systems is not justifiable. 
This disparity is troubling because it better protects the property rights of the 
wealthy over the liberty rights of the poor. Perhaps this troubling disparity should 
not be altogether surprising, however, because it embodies well-recognized 
pathologies in criminal law. The incentive disparity is one more way in which 
criminal law allows prosecutors not to bear the full costs of their decisions and 
averts the budget discipline that could constrain prosecutors—a variant of the 
“correctional free lunch.” This Article brings together several different strands of 
criminal law literature under the correctional free lunch umbrella while adding 
the financial incentive disparity regarding interim relief as yet one more 
correctional free lunch. Lastly, the comparative lens provides further support for 
widespread concern that criminal law is racist and classist because the financial 
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incentive disparity tracks predictable disparities in race, wealth, and power 
between the civil and criminal systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly half a million people sit in jail every day in America because they 
have been accused of a crime.1 That is far too many.2 In New York, for example, 
88% of defendants remain jailed after arraignment—or at least did before the 
2019 reforms. 3  Widespread pretrial detention has little to commend it: it 
deprives people of their liberty before being afforded much process,4 trivializes 
 
 1. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc 
/TQ9P-RMYS] (noting that 470,000 people were held in state pretrial detention in the United States). 
 2. See, e.g., SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT 
BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 77–92 (2018) (providing detailed cost-benefit 
analyses showing that an optimal resolution would mean detaining a very limited set of high-risk 
defendants pretrial). See generally Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) (explaining 
the many ways in which criminal law erroneously equates arrest with guilt). 
 3. Robert Lewis, No Bail Money Keeps Poor People Behind Bars, WNYC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2013), 
www.wnyc.org/story/bail-keeps-poor-people-behind-bars [https://perma.cc/NX3Z-X8JY]. Early 
results in New York show a more than 40% decrease in unsentenced defendants sitting in the State’s 
jails. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., JAIL POPULATION IN NEW YORK STATE 
(2020), https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/jail_population.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/AU6E-4K57]; see also Lauren Jones, On Bail Reform We Need Less Fear-Based Speculation—and More 
Data, VERA INST. JUST.: THINK JUST. BLOG (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.vera.org/blog/on-bail-
reform-we-need-less-fear-based-speculation-and-more-data [https://perma.cc/8YTG-N234] 
(summarizing data on the early effects of New York bail reform). Yet those successes will likely wane 
amidst New York’s recent rollback. See Melissa Gira Grant, The Shock Doctrine Came for Bail Reform, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 7, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157205/shock-doctrine-came-bail-
reform [https://perma.cc/WEH3-CPWN (dark archive)]. 
 4. See Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501, 515–23 (2019) [hereinafter Gold, 
Jail as Injunction]. 
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the presumption of innocence, 5  makes the public less safe because pretrial 
detention increases crime,6 and wastes a lot of money in the process by locking 
up a lot of people who are not dangerous.7 
In criminal law, prosecutors bring cases that seek to deprive defendants of 
their liberty, typically by way of incarceration. Such post-conviction 
punishment seeks to serve the familiar aims of criminal law, including 
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation. 8  But pretrial detention allows 
prosecutors to obtain their ultimate goal of incarcerating defendants not after 
defendants are afforded process—such as the rights to see all material 
exculpatory evidence against them, to a trial by a jury of their peers, to call or 
cross-examine witnesses at such a trial, or to testify in their own defense. 
Rather, pretrial detention affords the government, before judgment, the 
ultimate relief that it seeks.9 
Widespread pretrial detention was not always the American way. 
Historically, defendants had a right to release on bail in all non-capital cases 
rooted in the Due Process Clause’s presumption of innocence.10 Judges faced 
 
 5. See generally Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723 
(2011) (arguing that the dwindling presumption of innocence violates detainees’ due process rights). 
 6. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 161 (“Even short periods of pretrial detention increase 
the risk of recidivism.”); Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of 
High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 494–96 (2016); Paul Heaton, 
Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 759–68 (2017); CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & 
ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL 
DETENTION 19 (2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF 
_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/63LS-C4Q5]. 
 7. Detaining the accused costs between $9 billion and $12 billion per year in direct expenditures. 
See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 158 (calculating a cost of $9 billion); PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN & 
JAY SHAMBAUGH, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE ECONOMICS OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION 13 (2018), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/the_economics_of_bail_and_pretrial 
_detention [https://perma.cc/L6LV-LLU6] (estimating a cost of $11.71 billion based on payments to 
private prisons). A robust cost-benefit analysis that goes beyond the mere financial outlay calculates 
that pretrial detention reform could save $78 billion over the course of a decade. Shima Baradaran 
Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017) [hereinafter Baughman, Costs of 
Pretrial Detention]. Shima Baughman rightly calls this “a massive burden on many state and local 
economies.” BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
 8. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 325 
(2004). So too could we add providing comfort to victims or rehabilitation to this list, though it is hard 
to see American criminal law as meaningfully serving either goal well. 
 9. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14 (explaining that pretrial detention 
constitutes interim relief in criminal law akin to civil preliminary injunctions). 
 10. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 3; Baradaran, supra note 5, at 727–36; Shima Baradaran 
Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 857 (2018) [hereinafter Baughman, 
The History of Misdemeanor Bail]; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“From the passage of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 to the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46 (a) (1), federal law 
has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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fines if they did not release defendants charged with misdemeanors.11 Although 
pretrial detention rates have waxed and waned over time, they have risen fairly 
steadily over the past three decades.12 As Shima Baradaran Baughman explains 
it, “pretrial detention has become the norm rather than the exception.” 13 
Unfortunately, she’s right. “Since the 1990s, pretrial detention rates have risen 
72 percent.”14 In a short period of time, the United States went from detaining 
44% of our accused to detaining 60% 15 —a sizable shift for a country that 
incarcerates as many people as ours does. 16  These numbers will hopefully 
decline again amidst recent reforms,17 but the number of Americans deprived 
of their liberty on mere accusation remains high. 
In the American civil legal system, by contrast, disputes typically involve 
money and property rights rather than liberty. Granting a civil litigant before 
trial the relief that it seeks from the litigation is “an extraordinary remedy.”18 
Civil defendants’ property interests are so important that we do not extinguish 
or even suspend them lightly.19 The civil system does not rely solely on the due 
process backdrop or on judges to protect those rights by applying a stringent 
test that sparingly grants such relief.20 Nor does the civil system merely trust 
 
 11. Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 10, at 845. 
 12. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. Id. at 4; see also LIU ET AL., supra note 7, at 4 fig.1A (charting this increase). 
 15. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
 16. See DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 2 (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8HM-5QDM] (reporting a total 
correctional population of 6.6 million and a total incarcerated population of 2.2 million at the end of 
2016). 
 17. Although important, releases due to COVID-19 seem unlikely to meaningfully change the 
national numbers. Cf. Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 15) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing for 
releasing pretrial detainees as a response to COVID-19). 
 18. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In a previous work I explain 
why civil preliminary injunctions provide a helpful basis for broadly rethinking the pretrial detention 
system. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14. 
 19. Although most of this Article focuses on comparing pretrial detention to preliminary 
injunctions, procedural due process imposes significant restraints on prejudgment property restraints 
such as seizure or attachment in the civil system. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due 
Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 22 (2006) (“It is not an exaggeration to say that defendants 
constitutionally may be arrested, charged, prosecuted, and detained in prison pending trial with fewer 
meaningful review procedures—that is to say, procedures to test the legitimacy of the underlying 
charges—than due process would require in the preliminary stages of a private civil case seeking the 
return of household goods.”); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (reversing on due 
process grounds prejudgment attachment done without prior notice or hearing). For a more extensive 
explication of this case law, see generally Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Modern Views as to Validity, 
Under Federal Constitution, of State Prejudgment Attachment, Garnishment, and Replevin Procedures, 
Distraint Procedures Under Landlords’ or Innkeepers’ Lien Statutes, and Like Procedures Authorizing Summary 
Seizure of Property, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 223 (2020). 
 20. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (articulating that stringent doctrinal test as a gloss on Rule 65). 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers’ best “even-handed” judgment to limit their requests for 
interim relief to those cases where it is sufficiently important.21 Rather, the civil 
system relies instead on financial incentives to limit requests for interim relief. 
Civil parties—the government included, in at least some jurisdictions22—accept 
monetary risk when they seek a preliminary injunction; plaintiffs who obtain a 
preliminary injunction accept the risk of paying damages that the preliminary 
injunction causes the defendant if the plaintiff ultimately loses on the merits.23 
Thus, civil parties seek interim relief only when it is sufficiently valuable to 
them to bear the risk, which limits the requests for such extraordinary relief. 
In criminal law, where liberty is at stake and we purportedly presume 
defendants innocent until proven guilty, we should expect to see at least the 
same degree of caution before imposing a prejudgment deprivation. We would 
be sorely mistaken. Instead of treating prejudgment relief as extraordinary as 
the civil system does, criminal law deprives defendants of their liberty before 
trial as its default position.24 
Disparate financial incentives encourage this disparity in defendants’ 
prejudgment rights between the two systems.25 Civil and criminal procedure 
both rely on financial incentives to regulate interim relief, but they do so in 
opposite ways. While civil plaintiffs bear a financial risk when they seek interim 
relief, prosecutors face no such financial incentive to discourage them from 
seeking to lock up those presumed innocent. Nor does the judge have any such 
incentive. To the contrary, in criminal law, the financial burden regarding 
interim relief typically falls on the detained defendant: most defendants are 
detained unless they can pay for their freedom by posting bail.26 Thus, rather 
 
 21. Criminal law embraces a wide berth for prosecutorial discretion, including trusting 
prosecutors to protect the rights of the other side—criminal defendants. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). By contrast, the analogous term on the civil side, 
“plaintiff’s lawyer discretion,” rings strangely and is never employed as a method of safeguarding 
defendants’ rights. Indeed, the civil system deploys judges to formally rein in plaintiff’s lawyer 
discretion such as through limiting punitive damages, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (holding that a punitive damage award of $145 million violated defendants’ 
due process rights when compensatory damages totaled only $1 million), or limiting attorney’s fee 
awards, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 
Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (requiring that attorney’s fees be based on actual 
benefit to class members).  
 22. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
 24. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 3–4. It is certainly at least arguable that criminal law should 
attach greater procedural due process protections pretrial. See Kuckes, supra note 19, at 7. But this 
Article is not focused on the due process floor but rather a sensible statutory or rule-based approach to 
pretrial detention. 
 25. Substantive and procedural differences between the way interim relief operates in the two 
different systems also contribute to the disparate outcomes. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 
514–32. 
 26. See, e.g., JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
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than imposing a financial incentive on the government to limit requests for 
interim relief akin to civil plaintiffs, criminal law frequently imposes monetary 
requirements on the targets of interim relief, therefore making interim relief 
more likely. 
This disparity is troubling. The reasons that civil systems use financial risk 
to limit plaintiffs’ use of preliminary injunctions—limiting requests for interim 
relief and compensating for harms caused by interim relief—apply with even 
greater force in criminal law.27 Just as preliminary injunctions afford plaintiffs 
substantial settlement leverage and are therefore tactically quite desirable,28 so 
too does pretrial detention afford massive settlement leverage to the 
government.29 Financial incentives to temper strategic use of interim relief 
therefore make sense in criminal law as they do in civil procedure. Moreover, 
criminal defendants suffer serious harm because of pretrial detention—
sometimes loss of employment, housing, custody of a child, and serious 
psychological harm. 30  Pretrial detention decisions are made following an 
extremely summary “judicial process” that may involve a one-minute hearing 
with no evidence, judge, lawyers, or written briefing.31 In some places, bail is 
determined via videoconference with a judge or even by a bail commissioner in 
a jail through a speaker system in a plexiglass wall.32 That the stakes for a 
criminal defendant are liberty rather than property (and sometimes both)33 
suggests too that some mechanism to encourage restraint and perhaps 
compensate for harms resulting from summary process makes even more sense 
 
LOCAL PRACTICE 19 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial 
%20Disparities%20Report%20062515.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6WA-TX7F] (finding that 61% of 
defendants are detained unless they can post bail). Some defendants are simply ordered detained 
without bail and others are released with or without conditions, but setting bail is the most common 
resolution. 
 27. Pretrial detention should also employ a more stringent test—like preliminary injunctions—
that requires the government to demonstrate likely irreparable injury if a defendant is not detained, 
balances the interests of all involved, and requires the government to submit evidence showing a 
likelihood of success on the merits. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 559. But the substantive 
test itself is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 28. See infra Section II.A. 
 29. See infra Section II.B. 
 30. E.g., Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 10, at 842 n.33; Gold, Jail as 
Injunction, supra note 4, at 539–43. 
 31. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 1, 7; Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 515–19; 
Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 730; Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1399, 1452 (2017). 
 32. See Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The 
Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1733 & n.61 (2002); 
Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 21, 25 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy 
_for_justice/2_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3_Pretrial-Detention-and-Bail.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/8G9Z-QTM2]. 
 33. If the defendant has to pay a bail bondsman a 10% non-refundable fee for the privilege of 
securing freedom, then the defendant was first deprived of liberty and then property before trial. 
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in the criminal context than in the civil one. Without seeking to sketch out a 
structure for such a change, this Article broadly suggests resolving the disparity 
by leveling up protections for defendants in the criminal system to match those 
in the civil system.34 
As troubling and unjustified as this disparity is, it should not be altogether 
surprising. Indeed, it evinces and bolsters the literature regarding two known 
pathologies in criminal law. First, financial incentives encouraging pretrial 
detention represent one more correctional free lunch: the idea, in its original 
form, that county-level prosecutors spend the state’s money to imprison 
defendants and thus need not consider the full costs of their decisions.35 This 
Article unites several strands of criminal law scholarship under a broader 
correctional free lunch umbrella because they all represent different ways of 
making criminal law too cheap by allowing prosecutors’ offices to avoid bearing 
the full costs of their decisions. These misalignments of incentives avert the 
potentially constraining effect of budget discipline on prosecutors’ decisions. 
This Article then situates financial incentives regarding pretrial detention as 
one more example of this broadened correctional free lunch literature. Second, 
that this disparity better protects the pretrial rights of civil defendants (who are 
often wealthy and White) rather than those of criminal defendants (who are 
often poor people of color) highlights a previously unrecognized source of 
structural racism and classism in American criminal law.36 
This Article contends that the disparate use of financial incentives in the 
civil and criminal systems whereby civil procedure discourages interim relief 
and criminal procedure encourages it is troubling and unjustifiable. The Article 
proceeds in three parts. Part I explains why preliminary injunctions provide a 
useful comparison for analyzing pretrial detention and situates this comparison 
in the emerging body of domestic civil-criminal comparative law literature. Part 
II explains how the preliminary injunction system employs financial incentives 
to limit parties’ requests for such interim relief and why the justifications for 
such financial incentives apply with even more force to pretrial detention. Part 
III broadens the lens and situates this disparity within—and considers its 
contribution to—other existing bodies of criminal law scholarship. 
 
 34. This Article’s objective is conceptual and focused on critiquing and explaining the existing 
disparity. It does not aim to address the practicalities of how financial incentives to limit pretrial 
detention would work, such as considering at which of the powerful actors in the pretrial detention 
system financial incentives should be targeted—judges, prosecutors, or both. Nor does it consider 
whether fines, rewards, or a limited fund would best implement such incentives. 
 35. Infra Section III.A. 
 36. Infra Section III.B. 
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I.  EXPLAINING THE COMPARISON 
Preliminary injunctions provide a useful comparison to pretrial detention 
because these procedures are the primary ways that the civil and criminal 
systems deal with the question of interim relief: what happens to the parties’ 
rights before the case can be resolved.37 Both bodies of law ultimately afford 
one side to a dispute, before judgment, at least some measure of the relief that 
it seeks. In so doing, these bodies of law seek to minimize harm during the 
pendency of the case.38 So too do they seek to ensure the efficacy of judicial 
proceedings. 39 And, as a practical matter, both preliminary injunctions and 
pretrial detention have huge practical implications for the resolution of the 
dispute. In criminal law, for instance, defendants who are detained pretrial are 
much more likely to be convicted and face harsher sentences than defendants 
who can mount their defense from outside of jail. 40  Similarly, preliminary 
injunctions tip a judge’s hand about her ultimate view on the case’s merits and 
are thought to potentially lock in that view.41 
This comparison between pretrial detention and preliminary injunctions 
is one line in an emerging literature comparing American criminal and civil 
procedure.42 Although the systems of course differ in some respects, both seek 
to resolve disputes and, at least broadly, strive for “fairness, accuracy, and 
efficiency—albeit in different mixtures.” 43  One seemingly insurmountable 
 
 37. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14. 
 38. Pretrial detention serves this objective akin to the aim of preliminary injunctions. Id. at 507–
09. This comparison fits more closely after the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 
214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), allowed courts to consider the likelihood 
that the defendant will be arrested for another crime in the interim when determining bail. See 
BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 24–27 (describing the historical evolution of the purposes of bail); see also 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747–52 (1987) (countenancing preventing future crime as a 
permissible purpose of pretrial detention). 
 39. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14. 
 40. E.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 5; Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 715; CHRISTOPHER T. 
LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD 
FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING 
OUTCOMES 10–11 (2013), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report 
_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKM7-NNL2]. 
 41. Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 779 (2014); 
see also Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & 
ECON. 573, 600 (2001). 
 42. See generally, e.g., Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2017) 
[hereinafter Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers] (comparing class counsel to prosecutors and arguing that 
internal checks similar to those in prosecutors’ offices would improve class counsel accountability); Ion 
Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39 (2014) (arguing that the 
civil and criminal procedural systems should be more similar than different); David A. Sklansky & 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal 
Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683 (2006) (calling for comparative work between domestic 
civil and criminal procedure and laying out the theoretical foundations for such work). For more 
information canvassing the literature, see also Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14. 
 43. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 42, at 684. 
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difference between criminal and civil procedure is the divide between public 
and private law. But criminal law is not purely public law nor is civil litigation 
purely private.44 Prosecutors are required to consider victims’ interests and may 
often seek restitution, including substantial amounts in some cases. 45  Civil 
litigation not only seeks to provide redress to particular plaintiffs but also seeks 
to deter wrongdoing, which benefits non-parties.46 
Previous work has considered how criminal law could develop a more 
robust and balanced test for pretrial detention modeled on the preliminary 
injunction standard. 47  In short, such an approach would treat relief before 
judgment as an extraordinary measure that should be available only when the 
side seeking it would likely suffer irreparable harm absent such relief.48 In the 
pretrial detention context, that would mean that detention—the relief the 
government seeks—is available only when the defendant is likely to abscond 
from the jurisdiction or likely to commit a serious crime while on release;49 both 
 
 44. See id. at 701–04; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–87 (1984) 
(arguing that the purpose of adjudication is not merely private dispute resolution and that settlement 
often brings peace for the parties at the expense of justice for society); Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra 
note 42, at 99–100 (explaining that class actions and criminal prosecutions share important similarities, 
including in their public and private law objectives). That some conduct such as subway fare evasion 
has been reclassified from criminal to civil or administrative also suggests as much. See, e.g., Faiz 
Siddiqui, D.C. Council Decriminalizes Metro Fare Evasion: ‘I’m Sad That’s Metro’s Losing Money, but I’m 
More Sad About What’s Happening to Black People.’, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 7:17 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/12/05/dc-council-decriminalizes-metro-fare-
evasion-giving-its-final-approval-contested-measure/ [https://perma.cc/58B2-XZX2 (dark archive)]; 
Council Votes To Make Major Changes to Metro’s Fare Enforcement Policy, KING COUNTY 
COUNCIL NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.kingcounty.gov/council/news/2015/October/10-26-
DU-fareenforcement.aspx [https://perma.cc/PH2Q-TVU7]. 
 45. See Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
1385, 1387–88, 1398 (2011) (discussing criminal cases establishing large “restitution funds” to 
compensate victims and comparing these restitution remedies to class actions). 
 46. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 785 (8th ed. 2011). 
 47. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 532–58. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Absconders and further crime are serious concerns that pretrial detention seeks to avoid, but 
only in cases where such concerns are quite strong will they likely outweigh the harm that pretrial 
detention will inflict on the defendant. See id. 
  This Article and my prior work conceive of the government’s request for pretrial detention 
as the relevant request for interim relief. Existing doctrine and its use of money bail seem to conceive 
instead of the government having widespread ability to detain defendants upon arrest and rather view 
the defendant’s request for bail or other form of pretrial liberty as the request for interim relief. This 
divergence poses a difficult baseline or status-quo-definition problem that these works do not address 
in detail. For these purposes, suffice it to say that this Article and Jail as Injunction view the 
government’s request for pretrial detention—whether through unaffordable bail or more directly—as 
the requested interim relief because that is the first request for a judicial order to change the rights that 
the parties had prior to the commencement of criminal enforcement. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra 
note 4, at 509–14. Moreover, such an approach better respects the presumption of innocence than does 
a baseline notion that the government can typically detain defendants on a mere accusation of 
wrongdoing and a finding that the low probable cause threshold has been met. See Baradaran, supra 
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formulations are much more stringent thresholds than the bases on which judges 
now detain defendants, including by setting unaffordable bail.50 So too would a 
pretrial detention regime based on preliminary injunctions account for the 
substantial harm that pretrial detention would inflict on each defendant and her 
loved ones—such as loss of employment, housing, or custody of a child; 
increased likelihood of conviction; and the likelihood of a longer sentence.51 
Courts would balance these harms to the defendant against the benefits of 
detaining the defendant—namely, avoiding flight and further crime while on 
release.52 Lastly, courts would detain defendants only when the government is 
likely to succeed on the merits of its case.53 
Even if the substantive and procedural law of pretrial detention were 
reformed to better align with the preliminary injunction standard, one 
particularly troubling aspect of the disparity between those two procedures 
would remain: criminal law structures financial incentives to encourage pretrial 
detention while civil procedure structures financial incentives to discourage it. 
This Article critiques that disparity. 
II.  FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR INTERIM RELIEF 
Interestingly, both preliminary injunctions and pretrial detention employ 
financial incentives. They just do so in opposite ways. With preliminary 
injunctions, defendants who are preliminarily enjoined but are ultimately 
victorious on the merits get compensated because their property interests were 
“wrongfully enjoined” during the pendency of the case. 54 But barring truly 
egregious circumstances, criminal defendants whose liberty was wrongfully 
restrained during the pendency of the case receive nothing.55 In fact, in criminal 
law, it is the party to be restrained—the defendant—who (often) must pay 
money bail to avoid that restraint.56 Preliminary injunctions, on the other hand, 
 
note 5, at 767–68 (explaining that the presumption of innocence is rooted in the Due Process Clause 
and that it requires pretrial liberty absent serious flight risk). 
 50. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 523–32 (discussing the empirical literature); Paul 
Heaton, The Expansive Reach of Pretrial Detention, 98 N.C. L. REV. 369, 371–73 (2020) (summarizing 
the recent empirical evidence); see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 4 (providing powerful statistics 
regarding the widespread use of pretrial detention in America). 
 51. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 540–45; see also Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 307, 313–20 (2016) (describing harms that arrests cause). 
 52. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 539–52. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). In this context, “wrongfully” does not mean issued in error but 
simply issued in a way that does not align with the ultimate merits outcome. See Nintendo of Am., Inc. 
v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1994); Am. Bible Soc’y v. Blount, 446 F.2d 
588, 594–95 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 55. See Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1952 (2005). 
 56. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 157–85 (explaining the continued prevalence of money bail 
despite recent reforms eliminating it in some jurisdictions). Further reforms have come into effect 
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require the party seeking interim relief to post a bond to obtain such relief, and 
that bond gets paid to the restrained party if the movant ultimately loses on the 
merits. 
Plaintiffs—including the government, in at least some jurisdictions57—
bear financial risk when seeking interim relief in the civil system for two 
reasons: First, so that they will not overuse that extraordinary mechanism, 
including by using it simply to procure a settlement advantage. 58  Second, 
preliminary injunction damages can compensate defendants whose property 
interests are wrongfully restrained during the pendency of the case. 59 Like 
preliminary injunctions, this Article explains that pretrial detention is an 
 
since Baughman’s book was published, though some of those sit on fragile footing. See, e.g., INSHA 
RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2019 BAIL 
REFORM LAW 11 (July 2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/new-york-new-york-
2019-bail-reform-law-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/26HK-BRGC] (discussing New York’s 2019 
reforms); Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out To Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are in., 
ARNOLD VENTURES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-to-
reform-its-cash-bail-system-now-the-results-are-in/ [https://perma.cc/Z4ZG-BG9U] (discussing New 
Jersey bail reform); Grant, supra note 3 (explaining that the Governor of New York signed a partial 
repeal of the bail reform in the most recent budget bill); Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State 
To End Cash Bail After 40-Year Fight, NPR (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018 
/08/28/642795284/california-becomes-first-state-to-end-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/PR7X-HN5Y]. 
 57. N.C. R. CIV. P. 65(c) (“No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon 
the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the judge deems proper, for the payment of such 
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully 
enjoined or restrained. No such security shall be required of the State of North Carolina or of any 
county or municipality thereof, or any officer or agency thereof acting in an official capacity, but 
damages may be awarded against such party in accord with this rule.” (emphasis added)); Marine Constr. & 
Dredging v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 88-3963, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 23496, at *8–9 (9th 
Cir. Dec. 13, 1989) (explaining in dictum that the United States is “potentially liable for damages for 
allegedly wrongfully seeking an injunction . . . despite the fact that no bond was posted”); Corpus 
Christi Gas Co. v. City of Corpus Christi, 46 F.2d 962, 963 (5th Cir. 1931) (holding that the City of 
Corpus Christi was required to pay damages caused by an injunction that it obtained even though it 
was excused from the bond requirement); Provident Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Treasure Island, 796 So. 
2d 481, 487 (Fla. 2001) (holding that government entities excluded from bond requirements may 
nevertheless be liable for monetary damages upon the reversal of “an improperly entered temporary 
injunction”); Juniata Foods, Inc. v. Mifflin Cty. Dev. Auth., 486 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1985) (finding a government agency liable for damages despite bond exemption because “a bond is not 
a condition precedent to obtaining damages from a governmental entity”). But see FTC v. Apply 
Knowledge, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00088 (DB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188887, at *6–7 (D. Utah Apr. 9, 
2015) (holding that the United States was not required to pay damages for a wrongful injunction claim 
because such a claim was barred by sovereign immunity but offering no opinion on whether such a 
claim would be viable in contract and thus fall within the federal government’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity under the Tucker Act); FTC v. Bf Labs Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00815-BCW, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 184640, at *4–7 (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2015) (relying on Apply Knowledge for the conclusion that 
sovereign immunity bars a claim for wrongful injunction); Egge v. Lane County, 556 P.2d 1372, 1373 
(Or. 1976) (in banc) (hypothesizing that the legislature’s intent in exempting state governmental bodies 
from the bond requirement was to ensure their immunity). 
 58. See Dan B. Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunctive Relief, 
52 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1094, 1112 (1974). 
 59. See id. at 1094. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (2020) 
1266 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
extraordinary measure that affords one side (the government) substantial 
settlement leverage. That mechanism thus could be usefully limited by 
imposing a financial incentive to discourage the government from seeking such 
relief rather than using financial incentives to discourage the defendant from 
avoiding pretrial detention. So too could a financial structure parallel to that for 
preliminary injunctions sensibly compensate defendants for the harm that 
interim relief causes after a very hasty judicial process. 
Section I.A explains why the civil system requires injunction bonds—a 
financial incentive meant to limit requests for interim relief and compensate for 
the harms that such relief may cause. Section I.B then explains why those same 
reasons that justify injunction bonds apply with at least as much force to similar 
concerns in the criminal legal system with pretrial detention. 
A. Financial Incentives To Limit Preliminary Injunctions 
Civil procedure 60  treats preliminary injunctions—orders restraining a 
defendant’s property interest before the defendant has been afforded 
adjudicatory process 61 —as “extraordinary remed[ies] never awarded as of 
right.”62 But it does not merely rely on judges to say so and deny the vast 
majority of requests to ensure that interim relief remains extraordinary. Rather, 
civil procedure relies on financial incentives to limit requests for this 
extraordinary relief before judges are ever called upon to resolve them. 
Plaintiffs cannot obtain a preliminary injunction unless they first post a bond.63 
In posting a bond, plaintiffs bear a financial risk: if the plaintiff obtains a 
preliminary injunction but the court ultimately holds that the defendant is 
entitled to conduct the enjoined activity, the bond money goes to pay the 
 
 60. Although there are multiple systems of civil procedure in the United States, this Article 
focuses largely on the federal system for purposes of the comparison. Aside from an important 
difference as to whether the government bears financial risk when seeking interim relief, see sources 
cited supra note 57, the differences between the way that different states and the federal system handle 
preliminary injunctions are fairly minimal, see, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 
(Tex. 1968) (reciting a standard similar to the federal one); see also DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. 
ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 203 & n.783 (3d. ed. 2018) 
(explaining that “[v]irtually all states have statutes or court rules,” and many of them replicate the 
federal rule as to injunction bonds); Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1096–97 (“Except for Massachusetts, all 
states make some statutory (or rule) provision for an injunction bond. Historically most of them seem 
to have been derived, ultimately, from either the federal rule or its statutory predecessors, or from the 
New York Code of 1848.”). 
 61. See, e.g., 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (2013) (describing preliminary injunctions as restraints on 
conduct—typically the defendant’s—that go into effect pending a decision on the merits of a case); see 
also, e.g., John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 525 (1978) 
(explaining the practical ramifications of preliminary injunctions in various types of cases and 
explaining that they are “[i]ssued without a full hearing on the merits of the case”).  
 62. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 
 63. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
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defendant for damages caused by the preliminary injunction. 64  When the 
government seeks a preliminary injunction it need not post a bond, but it 
remains liable for damages as private plaintiffs do, at least in some 
jurisdictions.65 Requiring an American litigant to compensate an opponent for 
erroneous judicial decisionmaking is itself extraordinary,66 and exploring the 
reasons for this extraordinary measure in the preliminary injunction context 
proves helpful for the comparison to pretrial detention. 
That plaintiffs bear financial risk limits preliminary injunctions by 
discouraging plaintiffs from seeking them.67 Remedies scholars recognize that 
preliminary injunctions afford plaintiffs substantial leverage over defendants,68 
and plaintiffs’ potential responsibility for damages on a preliminary injunction 
urges hesitation before acquiring such leverage.69 The origins of this leverage 
are two-fold: First, the defendant is prevented from engaging in potentially 
lucrative behavior while the case is pending, so the defendant has a strong 
incentive to seek some resolution that allows it to continue the behavior in 
question.70 Second, because ruling on a preliminary injunction requires a court 
to consider the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, the parties can 
rightly view any ruling on such a motion as a strong indication of the judge’s 
view of the merits.71 Of course that indication is preliminary and without the 
benefit of a fully developed record, but it provides a useful signal to the parties 
nonetheless.72 A grant therefore provides significant settlement leverage for 
plaintiffs.73 To gain that settlement leverage, plaintiffs—at least in the absence 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See sources cited supra note 57. 
 66. Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Remedies for Wrongfully-Issued Preliminary Injunctions: The 
Case for Disgorgement of Profits, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 903, 920–21 (2009); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. 
Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (explaining the American rule that losing parties do 
not pay the attorney’s fees of the winning party), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
note (2018)). 
 67. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094. 
 68. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 41, at 573–74. 
 69. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094. 
 70. See id. (explaining that plaintiffs can face “enormous pressures” as a result of the immediacy 
of having to cease an activity that allegedly constitutes a nuisance without an opportunity to defend 
itself in full). 
 71. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 41, at 586–87 (explaining that a “preliminary injunction 
hearing may be a relatively cheap way to obtain information about how a court would rule in an eventual 
trial,” thus facilitating settlement). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 573–74 (describing strategic use of preliminary injunctions to improve bargaining 
position); Lynch, supra note 41, at 781 (expressing concern that judges articulating a view of the merits 
of a case for purposes of a preliminary injunction would be too inclined to maintain that view even on 
a more developed record); cf. Bert I. Huang, Essay, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1341–
42 (2013) (explaining, in regard to summary judgment and settlement dynamics, that “[n]othing quite 
cures overoptimism like a judge remarking, on the eve of trial, that in her view the case is a loser”). 
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of any financial risk—would have a strong tactical incentive to pursue 
preliminary injunctions in every case where such a request was nonfrivolous.74 
Requiring plaintiffs to bear the risk of compensating wrongfully enjoined 
defendants helps alter the incentive to pursue every nonfrivolous request by 
encouraging plaintiffs to limit their requests to the most important and 
meritorious cases. 75 It discourages them from using preliminary injunctions 
solely to gain a leverage advantage.76 It seeks to “discourage too easy an access 
to the judicial process in those cases where that process does not involve a full 
trial of the issues.”77 Or to put this in law and economics terms, the requirement 
for plaintiffs to pay damages to wrongfully enjoined defendants seeks to force 
plaintiffs to internalize the risks that their request poses to defendants whose 
rights are subject to less than full judicial process. A plaintiff should seek a 
preliminary injunction when its expected benefits to the plaintiff outweigh its 
expected costs—damages.78 
The bond requirement and damages paid to preliminarily-enjoined 
defendants who prevail on the merits also serve a compensatory purpose.79 The 
idea is that defendants who have not yet been afforded full process and the 
opportunity to develop their factual records or legal arguments should not bear 
 
 74. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094. Courts do not frequently deem litigation or even a particular 
litigation tactic frivolous. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas E. Willging & Donna Stienstra, The 
Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Rule 11, FJC DIRECTIONS (SPECIAL ISSUE), Nov. 1991, at 12 (reporting 
empirical results showing that the median judges surveyed imposed sanctions in two cases over a one-
year period); Mark R. Kravitz, Unpleasant Duties: Imposing Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 4 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 335, 343 (2002) (noting that some courts are reluctant to impose sanctions for 
frivolous appeals even though they have the statutory authority to do so, which, of course, would have 
a negative effect on deterrence); Roger J. Miner, Lecture, Professional Responsibility in Appellate Practice: 
A View from the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV. 323, 341 (1999) (“[I]t is a rare case in which we sanction even 
those who take frivolous appeals.”). 
 75. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094 (explaining that plaintiffs will seek interim relief only when “in 
genuine need of such relief and reasonably confident of the outcome”); id. at 1112 (“The threat of 
potential liability, however, may serve to screen out unwarranted claims . . . .”); see also Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 649 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that a plaintiff will not seek a 
preliminary injunction unless he is “confiden[t] in his legal position” because of the risk of paying 
damages and analogizing the damages requirement to a warranty). 
 76. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094, 1112. 
 77. Id. at 1094; Erin Connors Morton, Note, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c): 
Exceptions to the Rule Gone Awry, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1863, 1867 (1995) (requiring plaintiffs to bear the 
risk of damages serves to “deter rash applications for interlocutory orders and thus avoids wasting the 
court’s time with flimsy applications”). 
 78. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic 
Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005) (arguing that an 
important function of preliminary injunctions is to promote efficiency); Thomas D. Jeitschko & 
Byung-Cheol Kim, Signaling, Learning, and Screening Prior to Trial: Informational Implications of 
Preliminary Injunctions, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1085 (2013) (finding that some plaintiffs request 
preliminary injunctions “to signal bounds on their damages in order to elicit better settlement offers”).  
 79. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1112 (explaining that the financial risk to plaintiffs of wrongfully 
obtaining a preliminary injunction “protect[s] defendants whose rights have been dismembered without 
a full hearing”). 
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the risk of an erroneous judicial decision; they thus should be compensated to 
the extent that the court’s quick resolution of the issue turns out, on further 
consideration, not to in fact reflect the merits of the dispute.80 
In sum, the civil system requires plaintiffs to bear the financial risk of 
seeking a preliminary injunction by paying damages when defendants are 
wrongfully preliminarily enjoined. Requiring plaintiffs to bear such risk 
recognizes that plaintiffs receive substantial settlement leverage from a 
preliminary injunction and imposes a financial incentive to dissuade plaintiffs 
from pursuing interim relief too frequently. So too does it compensate 
defendants for harms they incur from abbreviated judicial process. 
B. Bases for Financial Incentives Limiting Pretrial Detention 
The reasoning that makes financial incentives a sensible way to limit 
interim relief in the civil system applies with at least as much force to 
prosecutors’ pretrial detention decisions. 81  Detaining a defendant pretrial 
affords the government a massive advantage in securing guilty pleas.82 Financial 
incentives could help limit that leverage.83 As with the civil system, so too 
would any compensatory scheme help criminal defendants who are harmed by 
drive-by judicial process (if that process involves a judge at all). 
Section II.B.1 explains how pretrial detention affords substantial leverage 
to prosecutors and imposes substantial costs on defendants as a result of 
summary judicial process, much as with preliminary injunctions in civil 
litigation. Section II.B.2 accounts for differences between the civil and criminal 
 
 80. Id. at 1093–94. 
 81. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 608 (2017) 
(“[P]rosecutors . . . have an incentive to request high bail to ensure leverage over plea bargaining 
negotiations.”); see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 335, 410–11 (1990). 
  Pretrial detention in America often turns, as a practical matter, on whether the defendant can 
afford to pay bail rather than on a binary of a court ordering a defendant released or detained—though 
those options too are possible. As in prior work, I refer to pretrial detention here as either a court 
denying bail entirely or a court setting bail that the defendant cannot afford and therefore results in 
the defendant’s detention. 
 82. E.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837, 
860; Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 556 (2018); Simonson, supra note 
81, at 610. 
 83. Although they have done so without the civil system as a basis for comparison, some scholars 
have called for compensation for acquitted defendants who were detained pretrial. See generally, e.g., 
Gabriel Doménech & Miguel Puchades, Compensating Acquitted Pre-Trial Detainees, 43 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 167 (2015) (analyzing the deterrent effect of compensating acquitted pretrial detainees and 
arguing that in some situations compensation can deter crime); Manns, supra note 55 (conceptualizing 
pretrial detentions as “liberty takings” that require compensation); see also Miller & Guggenheim, supra 
note 81, at 411 (mentioning in passing the idea of requiring the government to compensate acquitted 
defendants for time spent in pretrial detention in an amount determined by the number of days 
detained). One article suggests such compensation to “temper[]” the government’s incentive to seek 
pretrial detention. Manns, supra note 55, at 1950. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (2020) 
1270 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
systems, many of which make the disparate use of financial incentives all the 
more egregious. 
1.  Pretrial Detention as Prosecutorial Leverage 
As with preliminary injunctions,84 pretrial detention skews case outcomes 
on the merits. This leverage dynamic in civil procedure is intuitively sensible 
for reasons explained earlier,85 though I am not aware of empirical evidence 
trying to demonstrate its effects. In criminal law, it is quite clear through 
empirical evidence that pretrial detention worsens defendants’ outcomes, albeit 
for somewhat different reasons: defendants detained before trial are more likely 
to plead guilty, more likely to be convicted, and face longer sentences than 
similarly situated defendants who are not detained before trial.86 
One extraordinarily important reason for defendants’ worse outcomes 
when detained pretrial is that pretrial detention provides a powerful prod for 
defendants to plead guilty. 87  This leverage is particularly powerful when 
prosecutors offer defendants the opportunity to go home immediately by 
pleading guilty and receiving a sentence of time served rather than staying in 
jail for how many ever months (or years) it may take for a court to try their 
case.88 Pretrial detention also skews merits outcomes because it is quite difficult 
 
 84. See generally Lynch, supra note 41 (expressing concern that courts finding plaintiffs are likely 
to succeed on the merits at the preliminary injunction stage will then be “locked in” to that finding 
and, thus, more likely to ultimately side with the plaintiff on the merits). 
 85. See supra Section II.A. 
 86. Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 717; Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on 
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 
201, 201 (2018); Gupta et al., supra note 6, at 473, 475; Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended 
Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from NYC Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529, 
543–48 (2017); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability To Pay Bail Affects Case 
Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 511 (2018). 
 87. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 161–62; Gouldin, supra note 82, at 860; Mayson, supra note 82, 
at 556; Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 81, at 411; Simonson, supra note 81, at 608. 
 88. See Brief of Amici Curiae Current & Former District & State’s Attorneys, State Attorneys 
General, United States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys & Department of Justice 
Officials, in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 
2018) (No. 17-20333) (“[T]he accused may see an early guilty plea as the most expedient way to obtain 
release, as many misdemeanor defendants are sentenced to time served. This in turn may result in the 
conviction of innocent people . . . .”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be 
Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1356 (2014) (“In some cases, the periods that defendants spend in jail 
awaiting trial is comparable to, or even greater than, their potential sentences, thus substantially 
incentivizing quick plea deals regardless of guilt or innocence.”). 
  Ultimately it is judges rather than prosecutors who control the defendant’s sentence, but 
judges’ review of a sentence recommended in a plea bargain is far from stringent. See Russell M. Gold, 
“Clientless” Prosecutors, 51 GA. L. REV. 693, 714–16 (2017) [hereinafter Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors]. 
And prosecutors exercise a great deal of control over sentencing with their charging decisions. See 
generally Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 303 (2009) (describing the evolution of prosecutorial discretion and a prosecutor’s 
role in seeking substantive justice). 
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for the accused to mount a defense and coordinate with their lawyers from jail 
in ways that do not apply in the civil system because of the lack of physical 
restraint.89 
That leverage dynamic is exacerbated because interim relief—pretrial 
detention—inflicts serious harm on criminal defendants and their loved ones.90 
Some defendants lose their jobs, housing, custody of children, and suffer 
reduced wages for years to come. 91  Many defendants suffer serious 
psychological harm.92 For the children of incarcerated defendants, their parents’ 
incarceration is worse for the children’s health and behavior than divorce or 
even death of a parent. 93  Avoiding these harms creates an even stronger 
leverage dynamic than for civil defendants who seek to avoid having to cease 
profitable activity during civil litigation. 
The strategic advantage for prosecutors of obtaining interim relief also 
exceeds the advantage for civil plaintiffs because the criminal system does not 
allow defendants any meaningful “outs” short of going to trial and risking a 
harsh penalty at sentencing for doing so.94 Unlike in civil systems, criminal law 
typically affords defendants little meaningful relief on a motion arguing that 
the government has not stated a crime, nor do criminal systems have a 
procedure akin to summary judgment by which a defendant can argue before 
trial that the government has insufficient evidence to prove at least one element 
of its case.95 
 
 89. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 521. For defendants who feel confident that they will 
be convicted, it is theoretically possible that some might prefer to serve time in county jail immediately 
in pretrial detention rather than serve that time later in state prison post-conviction, but conventional 
wisdom suggests that conditions in county jails are far worse. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive 
Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 
517 (1986); Kerry Rudd, Opinion, Prop. 47 Spared Offenders from Prison, but They May Find County Jail 
Harsher, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Prop-47-spared-
offenders-from-prison-who-then-13413021.php [https://perma.cc/HD2M-RRE9 (dark archive)]. 
 90. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 539–45. 
 91. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 86; THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS: 
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11–12 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts 
.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y47M-
VGWA]. 
 92. Consider Kalief Browder who ended his life after several failed attempts during and after 
pretrial detention at Rikers Island. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW 
YORKER (June 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 
[https://perma.cc/9XWJ-D6QE (dark archive)]. 
 93. See Kristin Turney, Stress Proliferation Across Generations? Examining the Relationship Between 
Parental Incarceration and Childhood Health, 55 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 302, 312, 314 (2014). 
 94. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing Criminal 
Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1614–24 (2017) (explaining the sources of prosecutors’ leverage); 
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench 
Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973–75 (2005) (observing 
substantially higher sentences following jury trials than following guilty pleas for the same crime in the 
same courts). 
 95. Gold et al., supra note 94, at 1635–36, 1639. 
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Other criminal procedures do not meaningfully change the leverage 
disparity. Criminal law does afford some early review related to the merits 
whereas a motion for a preliminary injunction would typically precede any other 
merits-related review. But those criminal processes are far from robust inquiries 
into the merits and thus afford far less meaningful protection for defendants’ 
interim interests than one might think at a glance.96 A judge in a Gerstein 
hearing or a preliminary hearing need find only probable cause to believe that 
the defendant committed an offense 97 —a less stringent standard than the 
likelihood of success inquiry for a preliminary injunction.98 Indeed, criminal 
preliminary hearings are so pro forma that many defendants waive them.99 
The leverage disparity is exacerbated by resource disparities. On the civil 
side, defendants tend to have the resource advantage. 100  Most criminal 
defendants, by contrast, are vastly out-resourced by the government.101 Interim 
relief affords settlement leverage to the actor who initiates the case—the civil 
plaintiff or the government in a criminal case. That leverage aids the less-
resourced actor in the civil context but the better-resourced actor in criminal 
 
 96. For a more detailed explanation of this reasoning, see Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 
522–23. 
 97. For a defendant to be detained, some judicial determination of probable cause is required 
either before or within forty-eight hours after a defendant is arrested. County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable 
cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of 
Gerstein.”). That judicial determination within forty-eight hours is referred to as a Gerstein hearing, and 
the idea is that a police officer’s determination of probable cause alone is not enough to detain a 
defendant for more than two days’ time. Id.; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring 
prompt judicial determination of probable cause). State practices surrounding preliminary hearings 
vary significantly, but they typically provide an avenue for a judge to pass upon the merits of felony 
allegations and serve as a sort of substitute for a grand jury. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.2(c)–(d) (6th ed. 2017); see also id. § 14.2(a) (describing the lack of 
constitutional requirement for such a procedure that thus permits such substantial variation amongst 
the states).  
 98. Alschuler, supra note 89, at 518–19 (citing legislative history for the proposition that Congress 
considered and rejected a standard akin to the civil preliminary injunction standard and opted instead 
for a more lenient one); Kuckes, supra note 19, at 24 & n.132. 
 99. See, e.g., 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 97, § 14.2(e) (“[W]aivers by the defense exceed fifty 
percent in a substantial number of jurisdictions which provide quite extensive preliminary hearings.”); 
see also Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 541, 576 (“[E]ven where a defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing, it has become 
so meaningless in some jurisdictions that the defendant typically waives the right . . . .”). 
 100. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 123–24; Ion Meyn, The Haves of Procedure, 60 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1765, 1774 (2019) (mapping Marc Galanter’s terminology about “haves” and 
“have-nots” onto a comparison of resource and power between the civil and criminal systems including 
identifying corporate or other entities who are typically defendants as the “haves” of civil litigation). 
This resource disparity may be less predictable in some cases where preliminary injunctions are at issue, 
such as in patent litigation, but defendants remain the more powerful actors in many civil cases. 
 101. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 123–24; Meyn, supra note 100, at 1774 (identifying 
prosecutors as the “haves” of criminal law and criminal defendants as the “have-nots”). 
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cases. As such, the resource disparity compounds the effect of the settlement 
leverage that interim relief affords to prosecutors. 
Further, compensating defendants for the harms caused by hasty judicial 
process makes at least as much sense in pretrial detention as for preliminary 
injunctions. Pretrial detention proceedings are far more summary—and thus 
error prone—than are civil preliminary injunctions. So too are the costs of 
interim deprivation higher from pretrial detention than from preliminary 
injunctions. 
Preliminary injunctions may seem summary when compared to trials, but 
both are vastly more extensive than pretrial detention hearings. 102  Initial 
pretrial detention hearings often last as little as one minute.103 Some systems 
determine that an accused defendant should remain incarcerated following an 
arrest without any judicial involvement for days.104 Some systems set an accused 
defendant opposite a plexiglass wall from a bail commissioner, and others 
simply let the defendant participate through videoconference.105 By contrast, 
even if the briefing schedules are hasty, preliminary injunction motions are 
resolved after written briefing and a hearing. To pick a recent example, consider 
a preliminary injunction motion in a false advertising dispute: the plaintiff 
submitted a 30-page written brief 106  supported by declarations of several 
witnesses and more than 300 pages of supporting exhibits.107 In striking contrast 
to criminal defendants’ two-minute “hearing” without briefing, the false-
advertising defendant filed a 29-page written brief supported by expert 
declarations, a lay witness declaration, and 122 pages of documents108 prior to 
 
 102. For more details, see Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 514–32. I am not proposing a 
compensation scheme here, though others have. See supra note 83. I am simply mapping the 
compensatory justification for injunction bonds on the pretrial detention context. 
 103. Change Difficult as Bail System’s Powerful Hold Continues Punishing the Poor, INJUSTICE WATCH: 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT (Oct. 14, 2016), http://injusticewatch.org/interactives/bent-on-bail [https:// 
perma.cc/7XKK-XKMJ] [hereinafter Change Difficult] (explaining that pretrial detention hearings in 
Chicago often last less than two minutes); Length of a Bail Hearing in North Dakota: 3 Minutes, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://ncforaj.org/2013/01/25/length-of-a-bail-hearing-
in-north-dakota-3-minutes [https://perma.cc/G6PB-JDAM] [hereinafter Length of a Bail Hearing] 
(finding that pretrial detention hearings in North Dakota last for about three minutes); see also 
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 32, at 32 (“Currently, bail hearings in many jurisdictions are 
shockingly short: only a few minutes per case.”). 
 104. Colbert et al., supra note 32, at 1719–20. 
 105. Id. at 1733 & n.61; Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 730. 
 106. Brief in Support of Elanco’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla 
Foods Inc., No. 1:17-cv-703-WCG (E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017), 2017 WL 4570547.  
 107. Declaration of Grady Bishop, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547; Declaration of Roger A. 
Cady, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547; Declaration of Robert J. Collier, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 
4570547; Supplemental Declaration of Grady Bishop, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547. I excluded 
cover pages from this count. 
 108. Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Eli Lilly & 
Co., 2017 WL 4570547.  
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the five-and-a-half-hour hearing in a courtroom before a judge to resolve the 
motion.109 
Moreover, as discussed in more detail earlier in this section, accused 
defendants are substantially harmed by this necessarily hasty judicial process 
used to determine pretrial detention. Some defendants will lose employment, 
housing, or custody of a child, and defendants may suffer serious psychological 
harm. 
Based both on the lack of process and the harm of an error against the 
criminal defendant, error costs are higher for pretrial detention than for 
preliminary injunctions.110 Financial incentives that compensate for such error 
costs could accordingly play an even more important role than their civil 
counterpart. 
Thus, both reasons that animate the injunction bond requirement for 
preliminary injunctions—deterring unnecessary requests and compensating 
defendants for harms they suffer from summary judicial process—apply with at 
least as much force to pretrial detention as to preliminary injunctions. 
2.  Accounting for Differences Between the Systems 
Many of the differences between the civil and criminal systems that bear 
on whether to use financial incentives to limit requests for interim relief and 
compensate defendants for harm incurred suggest that such an approach makes 
more sense in criminal law than in civil procedure. 
Pretrial detention involves the government encroaching on defendants’ 
liberty rather than a dispute between private parties, which suggests the need 
for greater restraint on pretrial detention, perhaps by better allocating financial 
incentives. 111  Although the injunction bond requirement appears to be 
mandatory on its face,112 courts sometimes excuse the requirement or set the 
bond at a nominal amount when an injunction bond would overly dissuade 
challenges to government action. For instance, in lawsuits challenging cutbacks 
to public benefits or in environmental litigation, courts have excused or set the 
 
 109. Appellants’ Separate Appendix at 35, 78, 144, 183, 226, Arla Foods Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
893 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2252) (stating that the hearing began at 9:30 AM and ended at 
4:52 PM; recesses occurred from 10:33–10:45 AM, 12:22–1:34 PM, 2:29–2:40 PM, and 3:51–3:57 PM).  
 110. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (weighing error costs for purposes of 
procedural due process). 
 111. See Kuckes, supra note 19, at 14 (criticizing that “due process hearing rights that are routine 
in the pretrial stages of civil cases can be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the 
comparable or greater interests at stake”). It bears repeating here that although that calculus might 
affect the due process floor, the argument here is about a sensible statutory or rule-based regime rather 
than the contours of due process. 
 112. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c) (“The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary 
restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay 
the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (2020) 
2020] PAYING FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION 1275 
bond quite low.113 When the government seeks to restrain the liberty of criminal 
defendants then, the same principle of facilitating checks on government 
overreach counsels in favor of excusing defendants from paying a bond to avoid 
that restraint. To be sure, this analogy is imperfect insofar as excusing the bond 
requirement or setting nominal bond for a civil plaintiff challenging 
government action is meant to preserve an opportunity for the plaintiff to be 
heard in court; criminal defendants already have that opportunity regarding 
pretrial detention, at least technically. But pretrial detention hearings do not 
provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard; they often last for a minute or 
two and defendants often lack counsel.114 And detaining defendants chills their 
future opportunities to participate in their own proceedings.115 Thus, that the 
government is the party seeking to impinge on defendants’ liberty in the 
criminal system suggests at least that defendants should not be required to pay 
bail to challenge governmental overreach. 
Stepping back a bit, that criminal law uses financial incentives not to limit 
the massive settlement leverage that pretrial detention affords prosecutors but 
rather to increase that settlement leverage reflects a different normative 
judgment between the two systems: prosecutors should retain massive 
settlement leverage even as civil procedure strips that leverage away from 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.116 Caseload pressure is the classic explanation for what might 
justify that disparity; preserving prosecutors’ leverage has practical appeal in a 
system that, according to some assumptions, depends on prosecutors pleading 
out most cases lest it be crushed under its own weight by case volume.117 
 
 113. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2954; Morton, supra note 77, at 1869–70; see also, e.g., 
Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, where a party is seeking to 
vindicate the public interest served by [the National Environmental Policy Act], a minimal bond 
amount should be considered.”), abrogated on other grounds by Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t 
v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016); Johnson v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 929, 952 
(E.D. Mo. 2004) (excusing the bond requirement in a suit brought by homeless persons challenging 
city police harassment because imposing the bond requirement would amount to denial of the claims). 
 114. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 1, 7; Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without 
Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 386 (2011); Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 515–19; 
Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 730, 773–74. For more on the importance of counsel at pretrial detention, 
see also Wake Forest Law Review, Right to Counsel, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2020), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLt0g3LDC3s&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/3MFR-4688].  
 115. Defendants detained pretrial are more likely to plead guilty than those who are not detained. 
See, e.g., Dobbie et al., supra note 86, at 203; Gouldin, supra note 82, at 860. Moreover, it is simply 
much more difficult for an accused to coordinate with lawyers and mount a defense from jail than it 
would be while on liberty. 
 116. See Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094 (explaining that financial incentives help limit undue 
settlement leverage in the civil system). 
 117. Prosecutors’ need to plead out so many cases affords defendants leverage to “crash the justice 
system.” Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html 
[https://perma.cc/7F5V-XVB2 (dark archive)]. See generally Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor 
System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013) (applying the same idea to the misdemeanor system). 
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But even the assumption that prosecutors must plead out most cases for 
the system to function makes sense only if one assumes that the criminal law 
must maintain its current caseload and that prosecutor budgets are static.118 And 
those underlying assumptions are not obvious. Prosecutors could charge only 
the most important cases.119 
In a world of mass misdemeanors and the war on drugs I am skeptical 
empirically of the claim that local prosecutors’ budgets are largely consumed by 
politically mandatory cases.120 But even if that description were accurate, simply 
charging fewer cases would not offer a politically feasible solution. If indeed 
prosecutor budgets are too tight for prosecutors to provide meaningful 
procedure and maintain what they perceive to be the optimal level of criminal 
law enforcement, they should need to ask the legislature for a larger 
appropriation. Prosecutors represent an important lobbying force that typically 
gets what it wants from legislatures,121 in large part because their institutional 
incentives align.122 But cost concerns can sometimes impede prosecutors’ ability 
 
 118. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 548–51. See generally Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse 
Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183 (2014) (explaining that increased efficiency 
allows prosecutors to pursue more cases). 
 119. Which sorts of cases are the most important will depend on the locality and the enforcement 
preferences of the prosecutors’ constituents. See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 
86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 80 (2011) [hereinafter Gold, Promoting Democracy](describing prosecutors as 
agents of their local constituencies who should make policy-level decisions such as discerning 
enforcement priorities as those constituents would wish within constitutional and other legal 
parameters); see also Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutor Services of North Carolina, 41 
CRIME & JUST. 211, 258–59 (2012) (demonstrating significant local variation across prosecutors’ offices 
even in the face of efforts to centralize and standardize practices). But see Bruce A. Green & Rebecca 
Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 819, 841–42 (2020) (arguing that to 
the extent prosecutors as fiduciaries should account for public sentiment and preferences on a policy 
level they should adhere to the preferences of their states as a whole—or the country as a whole, for 
federal prosecutors—rather than their particular localities). 
 120. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political 
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2005) (arguing that prosecutors’ 
budgets are largely consumed by politically mandatory cases). See generally, e.g., ISSA KOHLER-
HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF 
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (explaining misdemeanor prosecutions as a means of social 
control); Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 
971 (2020) (empirically detailing the scope of misdemeanor prosecutions in eight jurisdictions); 
Roberts, supra note 117, at 1089–94 (explaining the rise of misdemeanor prosecutions). 
 121. Prosecutors’ lobbying groups are sufficiently powerful that there is no reason to worry that 
they would go unheard. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728–29 & 
n.25 (2005) (explaining the power of pro-enforcement groups in criminal law). But cf. Jeffrey Bellin, 
The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 174–76 (2019) (arguing that scholarly literature 
exaggerates prosecutors’ “power” because prosecutors secure victories largely through their alignment 
of interests with legislatures rather than by overcoming resistance). See generally Rachel E. Barkow & 
Mark Osler, Designed To Fail: The President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal 
Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387 (2017) (arguing that prosecutorial interests in the 
Department of Justice inhibited criminal justice reform in the Obama administration). 
 122. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534–35 
(2001). 
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to get what they want from legislatures—at least at the state level.123 Indeed, 
cost concerns have led some states to eliminate mandatory minimums, 
reinstitute parole, or shorten some sentences to offset the cost of increasing 
other sentences.124 Promoting the difficult political conversation about whether 
increased cost yields sufficient corresponding benefit can help restrain 
prosecutorial overreach and improves democratic accountability.125 
Even if one were to conclude that securing guilty pleas in most cases 
remains an important goal, maximizing prosecutor leverage is not the only way 
to facilitate guilty pleas.126 Criminal law could facilitate pleas in a way that more 
closely resembles the civil system127: it could improve information flow between 
the parties, afford input of judges or other neutrals, create procedures that 
impose transaction costs that both sides would prefer to avoid, and create 
procedural moments that encourage both sides to think about the case 
simultaneously.128 
Other differences between the two systems might seem, at a glance, to 
undermine the effectiveness of financial incentives to limit pretrial detention, 
but those differences prove less problematic upon further inspection. 
Financial incentives might seem to apply more naturally and effectively in 
the civil system, where disputes are often about finances, than in the criminal 
system where disputes typically involve liberty. But that distinction does not 
hold up as well as one might think. Although we tend to think of the civil system 
 
 123. Russell M. Gold, Prosecutors and Their Legislatures, Legislatures and Their Prosecutors, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTION (Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine & 
Russell M. Gold eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 561–64, 568) [hereinafter Gold, Prosecutors 
and Their Legislatures]; Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980–2000, 
29 CRIME & JUST. 39, 67, 71–72 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing]; Ronald 
F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 
219, 258–59 (2004). Cost concerns are far less important at the federal level because criminal law 
represents such a small slice of the overall budget, and the budget need not balance. See Gold, Prosecutors 
and Their Legislatures, supra (manuscript at 563–64).  
 124. Nora V. Demleitner, Is There a Future for Leniency in the U.S. Criminal Justice System?, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1270–71 (2005) (discussing mandatory minimums and parole); Wright, Counting 
the Cost of Sentencing, supra note 123, at 78–79 (describing North Carolina decreasing sentences to offset 
other increases to address legislators’ concerns about cost). 
 125. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive Prosecutorial 
Caseloads, a Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 148 
(2011) (“[A] lack of resources may be the best available check against overzealous prosecution.”); 
Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1734 (2015) (discussing the accountability 
problem caused by police and prosecutors circumventing “normal budgeting politics”); Gold, 
Prosecutors and Their Legislatures, supra note 123 (manuscript at 561–64, 568) (explaining that cost 
concerns can cause legislatures not to provide prosecutors everything on their wish list). 
 126. See generally Gold et al., supra note 94 (proposing another way to maximize settlements in the 
criminal system). 
 127. See generally id. (arguing that rather than maximizing prosecutorial leverage, the criminal 
system can encourage settlements through procedures similar to those in the civil system). 
 128. Id. at 1631–52 (explaining the ways that civil procedure systems facilitate settlements and 
proposing mapping those lessons onto the criminal system). 
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as largely about providing monetary redress for harm, cases in which plaintiffs 
seek a preliminary injunction are nearly always also cases where plaintiffs seek 
permanent injunctive relief.129 And if monetary relief were an adequate remedy, 
an injunction would not be available.130 Some such disputes are, at their core, 
disputes where finances loom large, such as in some intellectual property 
litigation. But plaintiffs also seek preliminary injunctive relief in civil rights 
litigation where finances do not play a substantial role.131 Thus, the injunction 
bond requirement might more naturally align incentives in some civil cases than 
in criminal cases, but the bond requirement applies nonetheless to discourage 
interim relief even in civil cases in which money is not the primary focus of the 
dispute.132 Criminal cases are not altogether different from civil rights litigation 
in this way then; discouraging strategic use of a potent settlement lever makes 
sense even though such an incentive may not precisely align the incentives 
because money is not at the core of the dispute. 
It might be tempting to justify the two systems’ disparate use of financial 
incentives with the idea that prosecutors are government lawyers and the civil 
system often finds private parties on both sides of the “v.” After all, financial 
incentives are one of the few available ways to steer the behavior of private 
litigants. But it does not follow that we should entirely trust government lawyers 
to make the right decisions without financial incentives and despite their own 
self interests. Simply trusting prosecutors to make the right decisions on behalf 
of the people is a common mechanism for prosecutor “accountability” in 
America.133 And although I tend to think that most prosecutors seek to do the 
 
 129. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.1. The exception would be preliminary 
injunctions in damages cases where there is “a strong indication” that the defendant will become 
insolvent before judgment. See Micro Signal Research, Inc. v. Otus, 417 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); 
see also 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.1. 
 130. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 131. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207–08 
(2020) (per curiam) (granting in part an application for stay in a case where the district court issued a 
preliminary injunction extending the postmark date for absentee ballots in the Wisconsin primary 
elections); Baqer v. St. Tammany Parish Gov’t, No. 20-980-WBV-JCW, 2020 WL 1820040, at *1 
(E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction seeking more humane 
conditions of pretrial confinement including conditions that provide for social distancing amidst a 
pandemic). 
 132. The bond requirement may be forgiven or set at a low amount in some jurisdictions, however, 
if the plaintiff is indigent. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 60, at 206–09 (detailing a divide across 
jurisdictions regarding whether courts may excuse the injunction bond requirement); 11A WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 61, § 2954 (explaining that so long as “the [district] court considers the question, it then 
has discretion to decide not to require security” and endorsing courts’ decision to excuse a bond when 
the movants are indigent, tying such discretion to the language of Rule 65 that affords flexibility to 
judges in setting the bond amount). 
 133. See Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors, supra note 88, at 720 (“Accountability comes down to trusting 
prosecutors’ commitment to public service and professional conscience in a regime where there are not 
well-established standards to guide them.”); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 588 (2009) (“To some extent, we rely on the chief prosecutor’s professional 
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right thing most of the time, they face structural impediments to achieving 
those ends.134 In the pretrial detention context, trusting prosecutors’ judgment 
regarding when to deploy an extremely useful strategic tool that makes their 
jobs vastly easier and imposes no monetary cost on them or their offices simply 
asks too much.135 
One other potential difference between the civil and criminal contexts is 
that relying on financial incentives that run against a government entity to 
incentivize the behavior of salaried public employees is more complicated than 
with individual parties where the incentive can apply directly. Achieving 
optimality through financial incentives on public agencies may be impossible,136 
but there is nonetheless reason to think that financial incentives applied to the 
organization can and do affect prosecutors to some extent.137 Some European 
systems impose such a financial incentive by requiring the government to 
compensate defendants who are detained before trial but not convicted.138 And 
indeed, many domestic civil systems must operate on this premise that 
government lawyers can be affected by financial incentives because they subject 
government lawyers to the same financial incentives regarding preliminary 
 
conscience: the prosecutor must remain individually committed to the ideal of responsible prosecution. 
Our most beloved descriptions of the job speak to the importance of a prosecutor doing the job well 
without any prompting from the outside.”). 
 134. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Institutions and Incentives, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 50 (describing prosecutors as “flying blind” and “fly[ing] solo”). But cf. Abbe 
Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 396–400 
(2001) (explaining why it is difficult to be both a good person and a good prosecutor, despite pure 
intentions). See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019) (questioning the extent to which prosecutors alone should be thought to 
represent “the people”).  
 135. See, e.g., Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 81, at 410–11 (explaining the benefits and lack of 
cost to prosecutors of pretrial detention). 
 136. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional 
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000). 
 137. See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 848–49 (2001) (arguing that constitutional tort 
damages deter police officers even if not at a perfectly optimal level). 
 138. Doménech & Puchades, supra note 83, at 168–70; Masson v. Netherlands, 327 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 10–11, 20 (1995) (reviewing domestic law that allows civil court to grant compensation from 
the state to defendants for damage suffered as a result of wrongful pretrial detention when a defendant 
is not convicted). The threshold for warranting compensation varies from acquittal, e.g., Hugo Tiberg, 
Compensation for Wrongful Imprisonment, 48 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 479, 480–81 (2005), to proof of 
innocence, e.g., Strafrechtliches Entschädigungsgesetz [StEG], [Criminal Compensation Act] [BGB] 
No. 270/1969, as amended, § 2 ¶ 1 letter B, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe 
?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002138&FassungVom=2004-12-31 [https://perma.cc 
/PU7V-W9HX] (Austria); 31 ch. 444 § LOV OM RETTERGANGSMÅTEN I STRAFFESAKER 
(STRAFFEPROSESSLOVEN) [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT] (Norsk Lovtidend [LOV] 1981:05-22-25) 
(Nor.); Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial arts. 293–294 (B.O.E. 1985, 12666) 
(Spain).  
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injunctions as they do private parties. 139  As Myriam Gilles explains, 
constitutional tort awards cause complex dynamics within an organization 
because they provide information to the public about that organization’s 
behavior.140 Organizations can also learn more about their own practices because 
of litigation.141 Similarly, imposing a cost on pretrial detention would draw lead 
prosecutors’ attention to when their line prosecutors decide to seek pretrial 
detention. Aurelie Ouss’s recent work empirically demonstrating a prosecutor’s 
office responding to changes in cost structure provides further reason to think 
that financial incentives at the organizational level would matter.142 Moreover, 
we tend to think in the asset forfeiture context that prosecutors respond to 
financial gains that accrue to the office rather than the individual prosecutor.143 
Line prosecutors seem to care about forfeiture revenue as a matter of directives 
from superiors or organizational reputation.144 
Lastly, even private entities face agency costs insofar as the party bearing 
financial risk is an entity rather than an individual decisionmaker. There may 
be reason to think that financial incentives within a private organization may 
help align decisionmakers’ interests with the entity’s, but the mechanisms by 
 
 139. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Gas Co. v. City of Corpus Christi, 46 F.2d 962, 963 (5th Cir. 1931); 
Provident Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Treasure Island, 796 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 2001); see also sources 
cited supra note 57. The only difference between the government and a private litigant in those 
jurisdictions is that the government need not post a bond in advance from which damages can be taken. 
See, e.g., N.C. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
 140. Gilles, supra note 137, at 854–55, 859–60. 
 141. Cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1056–
58 (2015) (explaining how litigation can provide information to organizational defendants). 
 142. Aurélie Ouss, Misaligned Incentives and the Scale of Incarceration in the United States 
3 (Apr. 2020) (unpublished manuscript), http://aouss.github.io/ouss_incentives_justice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VPl6-MTVN] (finding that criminal justice decisionmaking is cost sensitive insofar 
as devolving costs of juvenile incarceration in California substantially reduced juvenile incarceration); 
see also John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1593–95 
(2017) (explaining that concern about a police department’s insurance costs deters police wrongdoing). 
 143. See Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 108–10 (describing prosecutors’ incentives 
regarding forfeiture); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (2014) (“It is true that public enforcers do not profit from successful litigation 
in the sense of taking home a percentage of awards, as private lawyers might. Nevertheless, the 
institutional structures in which many public enforcers work provide ample incentives for salaried 
government employees to prioritize and maximize financial recoveries.”). 
 144. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 108–10; TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, 
COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL 
ENGAGEMENT 143–44, 151 (2000) (discussing employees’ preferences about being affiliated with a 
high-status organization and the way an organization’s status influences self-perception); see also Lemos 
& Minzner, supra note 143, at 856–57 (discussing the relationship between agencies’ reputations and 
financial recoveries). The Department of Justice “has regularly exhorted its attorneys to make ‘every 
effort’ to increase ‘forfeiture production’ so as to avoid budget shortfalls.” Eric Blumenson & Eva 
Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 63 (1998). 
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which financial incentives that run to an organization affect the behavior of its 
agents is complicated too.145 
Admittedly, that prosecutors should not be merely advocates in a purely 
adversarial system but rather should be ministers of justice complicates the 
propriety of financial incentives in ways not present in the civil system.146 But 
this concern about neither encouraging prosecutors to be too aggressive nor too 
passive to adhere to their minister of justice role would be best addressed by 
thinking carefully about how to design these incentives.147 
✦        ✦        ✦ 
Although the reasons that civil procedure relies on financial incentives to 
limit interim relief make even more sense in criminal law, criminal law does not 
rely on any such financial incentives. Rather, it uses financial incentives in the 
opposite way—to encourage pretrial detention. That disparity contributes to a 
more troubling disparity: criminal defendants are routinely deprived of their 
liberty before trial—at least if they cannot pay to avoid that deprivation—but 
civil defendants will not be made to suffer the indignities of having a property 
interest restrained while the case is pending unless the plaintiff bears the risk 
of financial loss.148 
This section has argued that such a disparity is unjustifiable. But 
eliminating that disparity could take at least two forms: leveling up the 
protections for defendants in the criminal system to better align with the civil 
system or leveling down protections for defendants in the civil system. In broad 
strokes, this Article embraces the former approach—increasing protections for 
criminal defendants.149 In so doing, this proposal is consistent with a series of 
 
 145. Cf. Levinson, supra note 136, at 352 (discussing the presence of agency costs in the public and 
private sectors but focusing on civil service protections as a protracted source of public agency costs). 
 146. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A prosecutor 
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
 147. It bears repeating here that articulating the idea structure for such incentives is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 148. Within the criminal legal system, Black defendants are far more likely to be detained pretrial 
than White defendants and are assigned higher bail amounts. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 9. A recent 
study using complex statistical tools and quasi-experimental design estimates that at least 68% of the 
racially disparate outcomes in the New York data are attributable to discrimination rather than 
differences in risk of nonappearance or further crime. David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Peter Hull, 
Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions 20 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econs. at Univ. of Chi., 
Working Paper No. 2020-33, 2020). Another study focused on Philadelphia demonstrated that the 
benefits of DA Larry Krasner’s no-cash-bail policy run disproportionately to White defendants. Aurelie 
Ouss & Megan T. Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The Influence of Prosecutors 23 (George 
Mason Legal Studies, Research Paper No. LS 19-08, 2020). 
 149. This Article does not consider whether, in at least some cases, the financial incentives overly 
dissuade civil plaintiffs from seeking preliminary injunctions or even whether it might make sense to 
exclude some narrow category of criminal cases from a system of financial incentives. See DOBBS & 
ROBERTS, supra note 60, at 206–09 (describing variations between different systems regarding the 
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recent articles that consider systems built to protect favored defendants as a 
model for protecting all defendants.150 
Leveling up here is the better approach because dissuading relief before 
judgment in civil and criminal cases makes sense. 151 Interim relief requires 
courts to make snap judgments, and those judicial snap judgments become a 
powerful tool for the winning side to facilitate “consensual” resolution of the 
dispute. Those snap judgments may hurt the restrained party who had no 
control over whether to pursue the interim relief in the first place. In short, the 
reasons that civil procedure requires an injunction bond—reducing strategic use 
of a procedural device to force settlement and compensating defendants for 
harms caused by hasty judicial process—make eminently good sense in either 
system. 152  Although such interim relief may sometimes be necessary, 
discouraging it where unnecessary is largely to the good. As an economic matter, 
requiring parties to internalize costs that they could otherwise externalize on 
the other side—as the injunction bond does—is also good. Cost externalization 
in criminal law under such a scenario would be far from perfect,153 but some 
externalization is better than none. 
Lastly, the criminal legal system detains far too many people before trial.154 
Consider some statistics from a recent empirical study of misdemeanors in 
several U.S. jurisdictions.155 For alleged misdemeanants where judges saw little 
risk of release and thus set a bond of only $500, it is hard to see why more than 
 
existence of judicial discretion not to require a bond); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2954 
(explaining that some courts “have found reversible error only when the district court failed to expressly 
consider the question of requiring a bond,” meaning that so long as “the [district] court considers the 
question, it then has discretion to decide not to require security,” and endorsing courts’ decisions to 
excuse a bond when the movants are indigent). Nor does it argue that financial incentives should always 
be used to dissuade interim relief. In some contexts, such as domestic violence restraining orders, 
dissuading such requests through financial incentives would be a bad idea. There are plenty of barriers 
that already confront victims of domestic violence from seeking legal process. 
 150. See Gold et al., supra note 94, at 1659–60 (suggesting leveling up criminal procedure to match 
civil procedure with respect to means of facilitating settlements); Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1202–03 (2016) (suggesting leveling up protections for all suspects to match 
those afforded to police suspects whose unions secured favorable treatment through collective 
bargaining). See generally Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327 (2017) (considering 
the judicial power to dismiss cases in furtherance of justice as a way to shed light on methods to increase 
justice for all). 
 151. In the criminal context, Miller and Guggenheim note in passing that prosecutors’ incentive 
structure encourages overuse of pretrial detention. Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 81, at 410–11. 
 152. See supra Section II.A; see also Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1093–94. 
 153. Many of the ways in which prosecutors need not internalize all relevant costs are discussed 
below. Infra Section III.A. 
 154. See generally BAUGHMAN, supra note 2 (explaining that the costs of detaining as many people 
pretrial as the United States does now vastly outstrips the benefits); Baughman, Costs of Pretrial 
Detention, supra note 7, at 3–4 (same). 
 155. See generally Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 120, at 1009–10 (providing an empirical analysis 
of how misdemeanors are processed across eight diverse jurisdictions). 
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40% of those defendants should remain incarcerated as they did.156 That pretrial 
detention is self-defeating—it increases failures to appear and the likelihood of 
a defendant committing a crime while on release—and that it is criminogenic 
more broadly make this outcome even worse than it may seem at first glance.157 
Indeed, narrowing the number of cases in which judges have to decide whether 
a defendant should be detained pretrial is a core piece of the newly emerging 
reform models in many jurisdictions.158 Typically, that narrowing comes from 
issuing summons in lieu of custodial arrest.159 But alleviating pressure on the 
bail system by deploying financial incentives to discourage prosecutors from 
requesting detention (whether through setting unaffordable bail or denying it 
entirely) can help achieve the same objective. 
This section has treated the two goals of the injunction bond—dissuading 
requests for interim relief and compensating those harmed by interim relief—
as necessarily running together because they do in the preliminary injunction 
system. The plaintiff bears financial risk and the money that the plaintiff puts 
up goes to compensate defendants. Although this Article does not consider what 
mechanism would best implement financial incentives in pretrial detention,160 
it is nonetheless worth noting at this point that not every structure meant to 
deter requests for interim relief need necessarily equate deterrence and 
compensation. 161  And if put to the choice broadly between deterrence and 
compensation, deterrence is the more important objective. Compensating 
pretrial detainees for harms such as lost housing or custody of a child will 
necessarily be imperfect remedies; the increased chance of avoiding that harm 
in the first place is better for defendants than imperfect compensation.162 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 161 (“Even short periods of pretrial detention increase 
the risk of recidivism.”); id. at 82 (recounting findings that “[d]efendants held for 2–3 days were 22 
percent more likely to fail to appear in court than similarly situated defendants who were held for less 
than 24 hours” and that “[d]efendants held for 15–30 days” failed to appear 41% of the time).  
 158. Wake Forest Law Review, Risk Assessment, YOUTUBE (Apr. 17, 2020), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjMuu3_iRCA&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/A8KY-6NVL]; see 
also RAHMAN, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that the New York bail reform bill included mandatory 
issuance of summons in lieu of arrest for many offenses). 
 159. See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 56, at 11. 
 160. Damages or a limited fund would be two plausible ways to implement financial incentives in 
the prosecutor context. Discussing the best mechanism for such incentives is beyond the scope of this 
Article, however. 
 161. In some class actions, for instance, defendants may pay settlement money that does not go 
directly to victims but rather funds a charitable endeavor or some very rough proxy of the victims’ 
interests through the cy pres mechanism. See generally, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in 
Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997 (2016) (arguing that compensating victims in class actions 
is important to facilitating deterrence). 
 162. Cf. generally David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option 
for Mass Tort Cases Response, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) (arguing that achieving broader deterrence 
by eliminating opt outs in mass tort class actions improves social welfare compared to letting some 
defendants with high-value claims opt out and receive more compensation). 
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III.  DEEPENING EXISTING PATHOLOGIES 
The existing disparity between the civil and criminal systems’ uses of 
financial incentives surrounding interim relief advances two existing bodies of 
scholarship that recognize different pathologies in American criminal law.163 
Section III.A contends that the financial incentive disparity represents one 
more manifestation of criminal law not forcing prosecutors’ offices to bear the 
full costs of their decisions—the correctional free lunch problem. It unites 
several different strands of criminal law scholarship under the correctional free 
lunch umbrella and then situates the pretrial financial incentive disparity as one 
more instance of a correctional free lunch. Section III.B then shows that the 
financial incentive disparity tracks predictable disparities in race, wealth, and 
power between civil and criminal defendants.164 
A. Prosecutors’ Free Lunches 
That the government does not bear the financial risk of its pretrial 
detention decisionmaking but shifts the financial burden instead onto criminal 
defendants is another iteration of a familiar story: criminal law is too cheap. 
Prosecutors’ offices do not bear the full costs of prosecutors’ decisions, and 
criminal law thereby structurally encourages over-prosecution.165 Criminal law 
enforcement of course imposes substantial costs on defendants and their lives, 
many of which are not easily monetized nor would they be easy to force 
prosecutors to internalize. But even for purely monetary costs, prosecutors’ 
offices frequently do not bear the full financial costs of their decisions; indeed, 
in some instances, the government as a whole does not even bear those costs. 
Scholars refer to this pathology of making prosecution too cheap by not 
requiring prosecutors’ offices to bear the full costs of their decisions as a 
correctional free lunch.166 This section begins by bringing scholarship regarding 
criminal fines and fees as well as asset forfeiture within the correctional free 
 
 163. This Article does not seek to explain historically why the two systems take different 
approaches. 
 164. See generally Ion Meyn, The Creation of Separate and Unequal Courtrooms (July 1, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that the race 
disparity between the parties in the civil and criminal systems accounts for procedural differences).  
 165. Cf. generally Brown, supra note 118 (arguing that increased efficiency in criminal law can be 
perverse insofar as it enables more prosecutions); Gold, Promoting Democracy, supra note 119, at 79–80 
(arguing that prosecutions should be brought so long as their marginal social benefit exceeds or equals 
their marginal social cost, subject to other ethical constraints); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor 
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1059, 1094–98 (2015) (describing decriminalization of 
misdemeanors as “the next generation of the ‘net-widening’ phenomenon”). Criminal law enforcement 
also includes policing, but the focus of this Article is on prosecutors and thus this section focuses on 
the prosecutors’ decisionmaking and not prior policing expenditures. 
 166. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140 
(1991) (coining the term); see also Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 194–204 (2017) (discussing structural misalignment problems in criminal law). 
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lunch umbrella. It then contributes one more instance of a correctional free 
lunch—the financial incentive structure for pretrial detention. 
Most famously, the correctional free lunch problem addresses the notion 
that counties pay prosecutors but states pay for prisons, so prosecutors can shift 
the incarceration costs of their decisions onto another geographic entity. 167 
When county prosecutors secure convictions and sentences in excess of a year, 
defendants typically serve those sentences in state prisons rather than local jails; 
county prosecutors thus shift the cost of housing those inmates to a different 
geographic entity—the state. 
When we view each county government not as a monolith but look instead 
at individual office budgets, the picture gets more complicated—and even 
worse—for incentive alignment. Adam Gershowitz rightly identifies separate 
prosecutor and jail budgets as another correctional free lunch problem even 
within a county.168 Prosecutors may care about their conviction statistics and 
their own budgets but not about the cost to the jail budget for housing those 
inmates pretrial (or post-conviction for short sentences served in county jail).169 
These sorts of “horizontal misalignments” appear in several aspects of criminal 
law that relatedly yield more free lunches.170 Police officers, to provide another 
example, might care only about arrest statistics and not prosecutions.171 
Still other bodies of criminal law scholarship address what we can also 
think of as correctional free lunch problems but have not yet been categorized 
as such. The government in many jurisdictions shifts some of the costs of 
criminal law enforcement to defendants through prevalent use of fines and fees. 
Criminal defendants are assessed fees for “law enforcement investigations, 
prosecutors’ preparation for trial, issuance of arrest warrants, and impaneling of 
a jury.” 172 Defendants are also charged for pretrial detention and for post-
 
 167. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 166, at 140.  
 168. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors 
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677 (2016) (arguing that local prosecutors should bear 
responsibility for their local jails to eliminate this correctional free lunch). 
 169. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 166, at 198; see also Gershowitz, supra note 168, at 681 
(proposing that prosecutors’ offices control jails to prevent this second dimension of a correctional free 
lunch). On a federal level, the Bureau of Prisons is housed within the same agency as the prosecutors—
the Department of Justice—albeit in such a large agency that one can hardly be expected to be 
responsive to the other. Cf. generally Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and 
the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 336–40 (2013) (arguing that corrections and clemency 
functions should not be housed within a prosecution-driven agency like the Department of Justice).  
 170. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 166, at 198–200. 
 171. Id. at 198. 
 172. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 286 (2014) 
[hereinafter Colgan, Reviving] (footnotes omitted). Alabama fills the coffers of its “Fair Trial Tax 
Fund” by charging fees to criminal defendants, to the tune of nearly $2.5 million. ALA. APPLESEED 
CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, UNDER PRESSURE: HOW FINES AND FEES HURT PEOPLE, UNDERMINE 
PUBLIC SAFETY, AND DRIVE ALABAMA’S RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE 17–19 (2018), http:// 
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conviction incarceration. 173 Similarly puzzling is the filing fee, imposed not 
against the party that filed the case as it would be in the civil system174 but 
against the defendant who would much prefer to both save the money and not 
be charged with a crime.175 Moreover, “courts have assigned counsel to millions 
of American defendants too poor to pay for an attorney, and later required those 
defendants to pay for their counsels’ services.” 176  In short, the accused are 
charged for the privilege of being dragged through the criminal legal process 
and being housed in hellish conditions. If they receive a sentence of probation 
or are released on parole, defendants get to pay for those privileges too.177 
Convicted defendants may face fines and perhaps surcharges on top of those 
fines.178 Compounding those fines and fees, defendants are charged interest, late 
fees, and collection costs, all of which count the time the defendant spends 
incarcerated where it is impossible to earn nearly enough money to afford the 
fees.179 
In imposing all of these fines and fees, the government offloads costs of 




 173. Colgan, Reviving, supra note 172, at 287; Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, in 4 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 205, 206 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu 
/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_4.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/K59Y-FGM8]; Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1175, 1192. 
 174. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2018) (“The clerk of each district court shall require the parties 
instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or 
otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $350 . . . .”). 
 175. See Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1935 (2014) [hereinafter 
Colgan, Paying for Gideon]. 
 176. Id. at 1929. Indeed, every jurisdiction in the country has recoupment authority to require 
defendants to pay fees for their own lawyers even though those lawyers were appointed because of the 
defendants’ poverty. Id. at 1931 n.4. Of the twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia that have 
indigent defense systems, twenty-three require defendants to pay for their attorneys. SUZANNE M. 
STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE-ADMINISTERED 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013, at 1, 7 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saids13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/48TU-S2K3]. 
  The constitutionality of assessing public defender fees against the indigent is questionable. 
See, e.g., Kate Levine, Note, If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the Constitutionality of Massachusetts’s 
Reimbursement Statute, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 191, 193 n.12 (2007) (collecting sources 
questioning the constitutionality of these fees). But see Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53–54 (1974) 
(declaring the assessment of public defender fees constitutional). For the surprising political story of 
application fees for defense counsel, see Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy 
of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2055–72 (2006). 
 177. Colgan, Reviving, supra note 172, at 287. 
 178. Id. at 285. 
 179. Id. at 288. 
 180. Defendants may also often be assessed restitution, but because that assessment compensates 
victims for their losses, id. at 285; see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3663A (2018); ALA. CODE §§ 15-
18-66 to -68 (Westlaw through Act 2020-88); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.753(3) (Westlaw 
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perhaps most troubling of all is that sometimes fee proceeds go to prosecutors’ 
offices,181 which reduces the marginal cost of those prosecutions. Not only, then, 
do prosecutors’ offices have their marginal cost of prosecution reduced by 
avoiding paying for parts of the criminal process, but sometimes that marginal 
cost is doubly reduced by actually obtaining revenue from those parts of the 
process. Other portions of those fines may go to defray other government 
expenses related to criminal law administration such as Alabama’s Fair Trial 
Tax Fund.182 
Not only do fees shift costs from prosecutors to defendants, they also 
create deadweight loss. Charging fees to defendants yields court debt that 
increases crime and thereby imposes broader social costs. In a recent study in 
Alabama, for instance, more than 38% of respondents reported committing at 
least one crime to pay their court debt;183 for defendants who incurred debt from 
mere traffic violations, nearly 20% admitted to committing a more serious crime 
to service their debt.184 More than 13% of respondents in the Alabama study 
skipped child support payments to pay off their criminal “justice” debt. 185 
Lastly, because many defendants are poor and cannot afford to pay this debt, 
they may face further incarceration over their inability to pay, which of course 
also costs government money and results in further deadweight losses.186 
Civil asset forfeiture too yields a free lunch problem because it allows 
prosecutors’ offices to reduce the marginal costs of prosecution.187 Federal law 
allows the government to broadly pursue forfeiture of assets bearing some 
relationship to an alleged crime188 and allows the Department of Justice to retain 
 
through Chapter 218 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.), it does not pose the same interest-alignment concerns as 
do the other fees and fines. 
 181. See STATE OF ALA. UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS., FEE DISTRIBUTION CHART [hereinafter 
STATE OF ALA.], http://www.alacourt.gov/docs/FEE%20DISTRIBUTION%20CHART.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T8DV-5LAQ] (providing a breakdown of where proceeds from various fees are 
distributed, including the “DA Fund”); see also ALA. CODE § 12-17-197(c) (Westlaw through Act 2020-
88) (preserving a separate “district attorney’s fund for the payment of any and all expenses to be 
incurred by [the district attorney] for law enforcement and in the discharge of the duties of his office, 
as he sees fit”). 
 182. ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 17–19 (explaining the “Fair 
Trial Tax Fund” and reporting that in 2017 that fund obtained nearly $2.5 million in fine proceeds); 
STATE OF ALA., supra note 181 (stating what portion of per-defendant fees goes to the Fair Trial Tax 
Fund).  
 183. ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 31. Because this statistic relies 
on self-reporting, there is reason to think it is undercounting. 
 184. Id. at 32. 
 185. Id. at 31. 
 186. Colgan, Reviving, supra note 172, at 290–91; Colgan, Paying for Gideon, supra note 175, at 
1934–35. 
 187. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 144, at 56; Logan & Wright, supra note 173, at 1195. 
 188. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2018). For a more detailed explanation of forfeiture law and the 
surrounding incentives, see, for example, Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 108–10. 
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forfeiture proceeds. 189  Some state laws operate similarly. 190  States can 
participate in the “equitable sharing” program whereby the federal government 
uses its permissive regime to affect forfeiture on the State’s behalf in exchange 
for a portion of the proceeds.191 Federal proceeds from forfeitures totaled nearly 
$4.5 billion in 2014, 192  and that amount does not account for state-level 
forfeitures. That forfeiture proceeds go to prosecutors’ offices—like some 
fines—is particularly troubling for economic efficiency purposes because it 
reduces the marginal cost of those prosecutions to prosecutors. So too does it 
circumvent an important legislative and democratic check on prosecutors—
appropriations and budget discipline.193 
Civil asset forfeiture and criminal fines and fees would seem to raise 
substantial due process concerns, but the Supreme Court has been utterly 
feckless when it comes to enforcing due process for criminal defendants outside 
the context of a trial.194 That statement remains true even as the Court has 
recognized that “plea bargaining . . . is the criminal justice system”195 and has 
clarified that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the 
bargaining context. 196  In the civil context, due process requires a pre-
deprivation hearing before a court can restrict the use of an asset 
prejudgment. 197  Indeed, that remains true even when the property to be 
 
 189. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 144, at 50. 
 190. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
463, 477 & n.66 (2017) (collecting citations to state and federal laws that are on point with this issue). 
 191. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 144, at 50–51, 54. 
 192. DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE 
OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 10–11 (2d ed. 2015); see also Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/ 
[https://perma.cc/HCD8-44AE (dark archive)] (finding that the federal Equitable Sharing Program 
involved seizures valued at over $2.5 billion dollars between September 2001 and September 2014). 
 193. See Bowers, supra note 125, at 148 (“[A] lack of resources may be the best available check 
against overzealous prosecution.”); Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture 
Laws, Policing Incentives, and Local Budgets, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2135 (2007) (explaining that state 
and local legislatures account for forfeiture proceeds in budgeting); Gold, Prosecutors and Their 
Legislatures, supra note 123 (manuscript at 561–64, 568) (explaining that cost sometimes prevents 
prosecutors from getting what they want from legislatures). That Ferguson, Missouri, for instance, 
could raise more than $2.4 million through fines and fees in 2013—its second largest source of income—
without any legislative involvement, see Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 125, at 1724, works 
an end run on legislative accountability. 
 194. See generally Kuckes, supra note 19 (arguing compellingly that the Supreme Court has provided 
vastly less protection for the pretrial procedural due process rights of criminal defendants than for civil 
defendants); see also id. at 14 (“[D]ue process hearing rights that are routine in the pretrial stages of 
civil cases can be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the comparable or greater 
interests at stake.”). 
 195. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012). 
 196. Id. at 140–44; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–66 (2010). 
 197. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11–12, 24 (1991). 
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restrained—such as a stove—forms the subject of the dispute.198 Refrigerators 
receive similar protection. 199  Justice Stewart criticized the Court for 
establishing that “the Constitution extends less procedural protection to an 
imprisoned human being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a 
commercial bank account, the custody of a refrigerator, the temporary 
suspension of a public school student, or the suspension of a driver’s license.”200 
Although a civil creditor cannot constitutionally ask a court to limit a civil 
defendant’s ability to control the property interest in his own home or stove 
without affording a pre-deprivation hearing,201 the government can restrain the 
body of a criminal defendant with no such pre-deprivation hearing.202 Rather, 
the Supreme Court has “rejected the argument that procedural protections 
required in [civil] due process cases should be afforded to a criminal suspect 
arrested without a warrant.”203 
That prosecutors need not bear the full costs of their decisionmaking 
encourages them to exceed optimal criminal enforcement. Financial incentives 
regarding pretrial detention are one more way in which the government need 
not bear the full costs of its decisionmaking. These financial incentives too are 
a form of free lunch, and they piggyback on the correctional free lunch between 
prosecutors and local jails. As Gershowitz rightly explains, prosecutors’ budgets 
do not bear the strain of detaining defendants in local jails.204 The jail budget 
does that. Prosecutors can (often successfully) ask the court to spend the jail’s 
money in detaining defendants pretrial. 
A financial incentive akin to preliminary injunctions where prosecutors 
bear financial risk to seek interim relief could eliminate that level of correctional 
free lunch problem. But criminal law takes the opposite tack. Many defendants 
are incarcerated pretrial unless they can afford their freedom, thereby shifting 
the financial burden onto defendants and away from the prosecutor with 
significant power to control these expenditures. Imposing the financial 
incentive to avoid interim relief on the defendant increases prosecutors’ 
incentives to exploit the fact that someone else bears the cost of jailing 
defendants pretrial—the county-level correctional free lunch. 
 
 198. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (holding unconstitutional prejudgment seizure 
of a stove and phonograph in a suit alleging default on debt as to those items). 
 199. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616–20 (1974) (upholding a Louisiana statute as 
consistent with due process because it required proof presented to a judge of the existence of a lien on 
the property and prompt judicial process to dissolve the attachment). 
 200. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 201. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11–12, 24 (home); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96 (stove). 
 202. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123 (majority opinion). 
 203. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 697–98 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Kuckes, supra note 
19, at 7 n.33. 
 204. Gershowitz, supra note 168, at 680. 
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B. Race, Wealth, and Power 
Race, wealth, and power disparities between the two systems track the 
disparate financial incentives. Put most simply, most criminal defendants are 
disproportionately poor, politically powerless people of color. 205  Most civil 
defendants are corporations or entities whose interests hold some political clout 
and whose executives will most often be primarily White.206 Critical race theory 
provides a useful lens through which to see these embedded power and race 
dynamics as structural causes for the disparity in protections against relief 
before judgment. 
A quick overview of some aspects of critical race theory is necessary to 
help ground this discussion. 207  “Critical race theorists assert that both the 
procedure and the substances of American law, including American 
antidiscrimination law, are structured to maintain white privilege”208 and that 
such racism is ordinary rather than aberrational. 209  They argue that law 
disproportionately harms people of color and maintains power hierarchies even 
when legal regimes appear facially race-neutral.210 
Now let us consider the profile of a typical defendant in each of the two 
systems. Poor people of color are vastly disproportionately represented as 
 
 205. Infra notes 208–24 and accompanying text. 
 206. Infra notes 225–28 and accompanying text. 
 207. I recognize that I am not a person of color and that interposing my own voice risks distorting 
the perspective of critical race theorists. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson from the Very Bottom of the 
Well: Critical Race Theory and the Supreme Court’s Peremptory Challenge Jurisprudence, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 71, 72–73 (2014) (explaining her hesitance to embrace the mantle of Critical Race Theory 
because she is not a person of color and agreeing with Critical Race Theorists that “perspective 
matters”); see also, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Critical Race Theory and Criminal Justice, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2014) (explaining the importance of “legal storytelling” from outsider perspectives in 
Critical Race Theory). 
  For much more extensive explanations of critical race theory, see generally, for example, 
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 
2012) [hereinafter DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY]; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013); Capers, supra; Richard 
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Essay, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 
(1993). 
 208. Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris, Battles Waged, Won, and Lost: 
Critical Race at the Turn of the Millennium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY 1, 1 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). 
 209. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 207, at 7. 
 210. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 207, at 2 (explaining that a central tenet of critical race theory is 
that “color-blind laws often serve to marginalize and obscure social, political, and economic 
inequality”); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory and Criminal Justice, 31 
HUMAN. & SOC’Y 133, 136 (2007) (“Probably one tenet that most [critical race theorists] would 
endorse is that racism is ordinary, not exceptional—the usual way that society does business—and thus 
represents the common, everyday experience of most people of color in this country.”); Derrick Bell, 
Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 369 (1992) (pointing to the Supreme Court’s affirmative action 
decision in Bakke “as an example of how formalists may use abstract concepts, such as equality, to mask 
policy choices and value judgments”). 
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targets of American criminal law enforcement.211 A 2014 study found that many 
police departments arrested Black people at a rate ten times higher than people 
who are not Black.212 To take a particular example, more than half of the people 
arrested in Dearborn, Michigan in 2011 and 2012 were Black even though the 
city’s residents were overwhelmingly White.213 FBI statistics from 2017 reveal 
that more than 27% of all arrestees nationally were Black or African American.214 
In cities, the numbers are even more disparate with Black or African American 
defendants comprising more than 29% of arrestees.215 These percentages are 
more than double the percentage of Black or African American people in the 
U.S. population as a whole.216 
Prison data reveals a starker disparity. In 2016, only 30% of prison inmates 
identified as White.217 That percentage remained between 30% and 31% over 
the previous five years.218 As of 2014, “[i]n twelve states, more than half of the 
prison population is black.”219 In Maryland, 72% of the prison population is 
African American.220 
 
 211. See James Forman Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
791, 793 (2011) (“Blacks are about eight times as likely to go to prison as whites.”); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1365 (2012) (“[T]he petty offense process is permitted to 
distribute criminal liability based on race and social vulnerability rather than individual fault.”); id. at 
1368 (“Misdemeanors thus represent the concrete mechanism by which the system is able to generate 
‘criminals’ based on race, class, and social vulnerability, unconstrained by standard evidentiary 
requirements.”); Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 120, at 1017 (“[T]he per-capita misdemeanor case-
filing rate is higher for black people than for white people for every offense type, in every jurisdiction. 
For most offenses, the per-capita case-filing rate for blacks is two to four times that of whites.”). 
 212. Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: “Staggering Disparity”, USA TODAY 
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates 
/19043207/ [https://perma.cc/C7HM-P9YW]. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Arrests, Table 43A, FBI: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTING (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-
pages/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/MH5K-D22U]. For these purposes I have used the labels from 
the Department of Justice’s data table. 
 215. Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Arrests, Table 49A, FBI: UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTING (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables 
/table-49 [https://perma.cc/ZM4D-N6CQ]. 
 216. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS: UNITED STATES, https://www.census.gov 
/quickfacts/fact/table/US/POP010210 [https://perma.cc/CA5Y-SVFZ] (estimating that Black people 
or African Americans comprised 13.4% of the U.S. population as of July 1, 2018).  
 217. See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017, at 6 tbl.3 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5Q69-TK6V]. 
 218. Id. That number ticks up only as high as 30.8% over the previous five years. See id. 
 219. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KL8J-MNNY]. 
 220. Id. 
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But race does not tell the whole story; intersectionality of race and class is 
important. “[P]rison has become the province of the poor and uneducated, even 
within the black community.”221 
Even within criminal law that has already disproportionately burdened 
poor people of color in its earliest stages through policing, we can see the 
importance of race where people of color are detained before trial more 
frequently and for longer than are White defendants.222 Poor defendants of 
color also receive less process and enjoy less of what might seem like a 
presumption of innocence.223 Most defendants’ bail hearings last for a matter of 
minutes. 224  By contrast, however, some wealthy (often White) defendants 
receive much more process. For instance, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates’s 
bail hearing lasted for thirty-eight minutes, and the government consented to 
pretrial liberty rather than detention.225 When the government later accused 
Manafort of tampering with witnesses while out on bail, he had eleven days of 
freedom and written briefing by his lawyers while the government’s motion to 
revoke bond was pending.226 The court then held a one-hour hearing on the 
government’s motion.227 Such robust process that wealthy criminal defendants 
enjoy represents a marked exception in a system that routinely prosecutes 
underprivileged and under-resourced defendants of color. 
By contrast, most civil defendants are powerful entities. And most 
corporate executives in America are White. 228  Powerful entities know in 
 
 221. Forman Jr., supra note 211, at 794; see also Valdes et al., supra note 208, at 2 (underscoring the 
importance of intersectionality). 
 222. Michael R. Menefee, The Role of Bail and Pretrial Detention in the Reproduction of Racial 
Inequalities, 12 SOC. COMPASS, Mar. 30, 2018, at 1, 4 (collecting sources); see also, e.g., John 
Wooldredge, Distinguishing Race Effects on Pre-Trial Release and Sentencing Decisions, 29 JUST. Q. 41, 41 
(2012); ACLU FLA. GREATER MIAMI, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES 
IN MIAMI-DADE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (finding that Black defendants “are more likely than White 
defendants to suffer[] longer periods of pretrial detention [and] greater rates of pretrial detention”). 
 223. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 515–23. 
 224. See, e.g., Change Difficult, supra note 103; Length of a Bail Hearing, supra note 103. 
 225. See Court Docket at 8, United States v. Manafort, 314 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 
2018) (No. 1:17-CR-00201). 
 226. Peter Maass, Paul Manafort Has Inadvertently Helped America by Showing the Absurdities of Its 
Bail System, INTERCEPT (June 9, 2018, 9:04 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/09/paul-manafort-
bail-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/ZT48-X49E] (“That’s an 11-day window, from June 4 until June 15, 
during which Manafort remains free — while other people in that situation would probably be put 
behind bars right away.”); Tierney Sneed, Judge Sends Manafort to Jail After Revoking His Bail, TPM 
(June 15, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/judge-sends-manafort-to-jail-
after-revoking-his-bail [https://perma.cc/3XPC-3TRC]. 
 227. Sneed, supra note 226. 
 228. See, e.g., CTR. FOR TALENT INNOVATION, BEING BLACK IN CORPORATE AMERICA 2 
(2019), https://www.talentinnovation.org/_private/assets/BeingBlack-KeyFindings-CTI.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7VE8-D7UM] (reporting that 0.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs are Black and 3.2% of 
Executive/senior-level officials and managers are Black); Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate 
Policy on Women and People of Color, 7 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 213, 220 & n.36 (2003) (noting that 
only a “tiny percentage of corporate directors and senior executives are women or people of color” and 
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advance that they are much more likely to be defendants than plaintiffs in the 
civil justice system.229 That advanced knowledge permits them to direct their 
considerable resources toward a defendant-friendly agenda, both through 
rulemaking and amicus briefing.230 Repeat players, like corporate defendants, 
can also strategically settle and appeal individual cases to benefit from longer-
term gains through favorable rules.231 One-shot plaintiffs, however, have no 
such available strategy or even interest in a rule-based victory.232 
The comparative lens between the civil and criminal systems helps reveal 
a mechanism of racism and classism built into the fabric of American criminal 
law and its lack of protection for the rights of the accused. While civil procedure 
ensures that defendants’ property interests are not frequently restrained before 
judgment, criminal law’s incentive structure encourages deprivation of 
defendants’ pretrial liberty. These disparities in race, wealth, and political 
power between the two systems suggest significant structural impediments to 
eliminating the financial incentive disparity. 
Civil asset forfeiture also provides a useful comparative lens because it 
eliminates the property/liberty distinction and focuses on property interests 
across both systems. Preliminary injunctions are difficult for plaintiffs to 
obtain—in part because they face a financial incentive to dissuade them from 
seeking such relief.233 By contrast, criminal defendants can be deprived of their 
property rights without much meaningful protection at all via civil forfeiture.234 
 
that “only 0.6% of senior-level managers in major companies are African-American”); Frank Dobbin 
& Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-
diversity-programs-fail [https://perma.cc/HN8Z-FYG9 (dark archive)] (recounting that among all 
U.S. companies with 100 or more employees, Black men made up only 3.3% of management as of 2014). 
 229. See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1797 (2014) (“[When] ‘[p]laintiff’ and ‘defendant’ 
became identity-based categories that meant that not all would benefit or suffer equally from the impact 
of civil rules.”); see also Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 663 
(2010) (discussing the typical allocation of sophistication between the parties in various types of civil 
cases). I have not been able to find any hard statistics about what portion of defendants in civil litigation 
are large corporations or other entities. 
 230. See Marc Galanter, Essay, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974). 
 231. Id. at 100–02; see also id. at 103–04 (explaining that because “haves” tend to be repeat players 
while “have nots” tend to be one-shotters, “a legal system formally neutral as between ‘haves’ and ‘have-
nots’ may perpetuate and augment the advantages of the former”). 
 232. Id. at 100–03.  
 233. For more detail on the preliminary injunction standard and the comparison to criminal 
pretrial detention, see generally Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4. 
 234. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) 
(describing the civil forfeiture system as one “where police can seize property with limited judicial 
oversight and retain it for their own use” that “has led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses”); Stefan 
B. Herpel, Toward a Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil Forfeiture in America, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1910, 1911 
(1998) (reviewing LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY (1996)) 
(“[C]ivil in rem forfeiture proceedings have been used—and increasingly are being used—as an 
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Civil forfeiture requires neither a conviction nor even a criminal charge235 and 
lacks the procedural protections such as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or jury trial right.236 Even Justice Thomas has expressed great concern 
that civil forfeiture proceedings “frequently target the poor and other groups 
least able to defend their interests.”237 
So too may we owe the persistence of widely disparate standards for 
pretrial procedural due process between the civil and criminal systems to the 
disparity in race, wealth, and power between defendants in the two systems.238 
CONCLUSION 
Financial incentives discourage plaintiffs from seeking preliminary 
injunctions. That tempering incentive is important because interim relief is an 
extraordinary remedy that affords one party substantial settlement leverage. So 
too do financial incentives compensate defendants for harms incurred because 
of summary judicial process in the preliminary injunction decision. Those same 
reasons—settlement leverage and compensating for summary process—apply 
with at least as much force to criminal pretrial detention. Indeed, discouraging 
the government from using one form of liberty deprivation—pretrial 
detention—as a means of facilitating a waiver of constitutional rights and 
further liberty deprivation—a guilty plea and ensuing sentence—makes even 
more sense in criminal law than do financial incentives for preliminary 
injunctions. But the criminal system does not use financial incentives to limit 
the number of accused defendants who lose their liberty before judgment. It 
does the opposite. Criminal law encourages interim relief—detaining criminal 
defendants unless they can pay to secure their freedom. This disparity is 
troubling and unjustified. 
Recognizing this disparity contributes to the literature regarding well-
recognized pathologies in criminal law: correctional free lunches and racism and 
classism. Scholars have articulated a few manifestations of the correctional free 
lunch problem whereby prosecutors do not bear the full costs of their decisions. 
After situating several other bodies of criminal law scholarship within the 
correctional free lunch umbrella, this Article explains how financial incentives 
surrounding pretrial detention constitute one more version of a correctional free 
lunch that evades the constraining force of budget discipline. The comparative 
lens helps bring to light this troubling disparity between a system that 
 
expedient to circumvent the usual protections accorded to defendants in criminal proceedings, and to 
augment federal, state, and local treasuries.”). 
 235. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Timbs 
v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091). 
 236. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847–48. 
 237. Id. at 848. 
 238. See generally Kuckes, supra note 19 (detailing that disparity in pretrial due process). 
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structurally protects defendants against its overuse before judgment (civil) and 
one that structurally facilitates overuse (criminal). That the typical criminal 
defendant is a poor person of color without political power and the typical civil 
defendant is a wealthy corporation suggests that the financial incentive 
disparity may persist in part because of racism, classism, and power disparities. 
The aim of this Article is conceptual; it builds out a novel comparison as 
a critique of disparities between the criminal and civil systems. And it argues 
that the disparity would be best resolved by importing some form of financial 
incentives to the pretrial detention context. It does not, however, seek to specify 
the mechanism by which pretrial detention should embrace financial incentives. 
A pure analog to the injunction bond seems quite unlikely to be the right 
answer. Rather, building such a structure for the criminal legal system will 
require careful attention to differences between the two systems, including the 
massive resource and leverage disparities discussed above. Such a task will have 
to be left for another day. 
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